

104

A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN ANGOLA

Y 4. IN 8/16:P 31/8

A Current Assessment of the Peace P...

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 1, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN ANGOLA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 1996

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, [chairperson of the subcommittee] presiding.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will now come to order.

Almost a year ago to the day, this subcommittee met to discuss the progress made in the peace process in Angola and on the prospects for a successful conclusion to that process—a transition to a stable, representative government.

We discussed the background to the conflict and the economic, social, and political damage caused by 20 years of civil war. We were filled with the hope that there may finally be an opportunity for a genuine, lasting peace in Angola and for true reconciliation between the two sides in the struggle.

However, as I emphasized then and I feel must be stressed now, we have been filled with hope for peace in Angola many times only to be disappointed by the sluggish pace toward true progress.

A year ago, we looked to the announcement made in May 1995 about UNITA leader, Dr. Savimbi, becoming Vice President of Angola as a concrete indicator that progress was being made toward the establishment of a government of national unity. That reconciliation was, indeed, an attainable goal for Angola.

In the current scenario, questions are still being raised about the nature of the vice presidency and other key positions, given the fact that there have really been no formal discussion of command structure, description of duties, or issue jurisdiction.

A year ago, military issues were first on the agenda, and today many still remain unresolved. The success of the peace process hinges on the resolution of these volatile issues and the implementation of the key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

Of course, it would be unfair to say that none of the objectives have been achieved. However, one would expect some minimal progress to be made over the course of an entire year, given that \$350 million is being spent annually on the U.N. peacekeeping operation.

But we must face reality.

Much remains to be done and time is running short. Further delays and procrastination could still jeopardize the peace process. It is time for both parties to demonstrate their commitment to the

peace process by fulfilling their promises and by accelerating the pace of implementation.

Without the basic elements in place, without a skeletal government infrastructure, without a schematic of priorities for reconstruction, Angola cannot proceed to the next step along its path toward a future of economic and political growth. The peace process is merely the first step in the evolution toward a stable society and effective government.

However, I must reiterate that none of this will be possible without the commitment of the two parties involved. The United States cannot do it. The United Nations and the entire international community cannot do it. The Government of Angola and UNITA must be determined to set aside personal interests and past animosity and "jump start" the process by focusing more on the future of their country and the well-being of the people of Angola.

One can only hope.

I would like to recognize a wonderful member of our subcommittee, Mr. Victor Frazer, for any opening statements he might make.

Mr. FRAZER. Madam Chairman, the only statement I will have to make is that I will endorse the statement that you have made. And I will reiterate what you have said, that I think the time is long past when the United States should be expected to mend fences alone, resolve conflicts alone. People involved in the conflicts are going to have to take a greater role in their own restoration.

Of course, we will continue to be there and support these countries involved. But I think that because of problems at home and more attention required at home, we are no longer in a position to be the world's fence mender.

But we continue to be supportive, so I endorse your statement.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Mr. Hastings, before I introduce the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell, I was wondering if you wanted to make some opening statements about Angola?

Mr. HASTINGS. Madam Chairlady, I associate myself with the remarks that you all have made, and I am happy for the hearing.

Thank you very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Alcee. Thank you.

And now I would like to introduce our first panel, headed by Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

Ms. Bushnell joined the Foreign Service in October 1991 when her first overseas assignment took her to Senegal. She later served for 2 years in the U.S. Consulate General in India before returning to Washington to head the Executive Development Division of the Foreign Service Institute.

In 1989, Ms. Bushnell began a second tour of duty in Senegal as Deputy Chief of Mission. Three years later, she joined the 35th class of the Senior Seminar until being named to her current post. Ms. Bushnell has received numerous accolades for her outstanding service and is now awaiting confirmation of her nomination as Ambassador to Kenya.

We wish her the best and Godspeed.

Ms. Bushnell is accompanied today by Ambassador Paul Hare, who is our Special Envoy to Angola. Ambassador Hare has just recently returned from Angola.

We welcome them both and thank them for being here today.

Before you begin your statement, Ms. Bushnell, I was wondering if we could ask you to give the subcommittee an update on the situation in Liberia. We have had a lot of members interested in the situation over there. Of particular interest is what Assistant Secretary Moose has been able to accomplish during his stay there; what sort of support we have been able to garner from countries in West Africa who have been supportive of reporting on the activities of one or another of the factions that are now fighting in Monrovia.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Certainly, Madam Chairperson.

George Moose is, as we speak, on his way back from Monrovia. The events of the past few days, I have to tell you, left us in the Administration absolutely heart-stricken once again.

Members of this committee and members of the Administration have worked very hard in partnership with the ECOWAS community, and particularly the Ghanaians, to try and bring the factions to peace.

The Ghanaians continue to work very hard. The Ghanaian ECOWAS ambassador continues to negotiate with the faction leaders.

Last night was much calmer than the night before. And today is much calmer. When we spoke to the embassy earlier, they were saying there was some sporadic shooting and shelling, but it was not in the vicinity of the embassy as it had been a couple of times yesterday.

This does not mean that calm has returned to Liberia completely.

President Rawlings has called an extraordinary session of ECOWAS next week on the 7th and 8th of May and has invited the faction leaders to attend. We have not heard whether they have accepted the invitation or not. But he would like them to account for what has happened and do whatever he can to get them back into the Abuja framework.

Assistant Secretary Moose had been in Geneva on Friday for the first meeting of the International Contact Group on Liberia. We are not the only country that is concerned about Liberia. I think that we have done a lot on Liberia.

Ambassador Moose was engaging other governments and, indeed, found that other governments wanted to be engaged in the effort to promote peace.

This was Friday. And, of course, we had the further escalation of violence in between. I think that we need to continue to try and get these factions back into an Abuja "framework". I do not want to say the Abuja "Accords" because I think it may be too late for that. But nevertheless there is a foundation there that I think we need to build on.

You asked about other members of the West African community, and I would like to applaud, truly, the perseverance and the dedication of President Rawlings and the Ghanaians. They really have stuck with this through enormous difficulty and against great obstacles and continue to work very hard for peace.

After Geneva, Assistant Secretary Moose went to Ghana and to Cote d'Ivoire, and found that equal concern there. The neighbors are concerned, as they should be. They will, I believe, join the Ghanaians in trying to get the faction leaders to come to some sort of peace and begin thinking about the people of Liberia and not just themselves.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That would be wonderful. Well, thank you so much. We look forward to hearing the rest of your testimony. We are going to stand in recess so we can go vote.

The subcommittee will be in recess.

[Recess.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will once again be in session. And we understand your flight time, so don't worry.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PRUDENCE BUSHNELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PAUL HARE, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY TO ANGOLA

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE PRUDENCE BUSHNELL

Ms. BUSHNELL. Good afternoon, Madam Chairperson, members of the subcommittee. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to testify on our ongoing efforts to consolidate peace and democracy in Angola. I believe that the strong cooperation between the Administration and Congress has contributed greatly to our success in bringing these goals closer to realization. Your continued support for peacekeeping in Angola is critical to the peace process.

Almost 3 years ago, as the Administration prepared to launch a diplomatic initiative to restart peace negotiations, many observers predicted that the negotiations would fail and, even after the Lusaka Protocol was signed, warned that process would not succeed. Today Angola is on the verge of what few observers thought possible—genuine lasting peace.

An important factor in Angola's progress toward peace has been the sustained engagement of U.S. diplomacy and the close collaboration we have enjoyed with the United Nations, our Troika partners, Angola's concerned neighbors, and the Angolan parties themselves.

Our diplomatic team played a key role in the negotiations that produced the Lusaka Protocol; and since then, we have used our leverage to pressure the parties to honor their commitments.

We have also worked closely and productively with the United Nations to assure that UNAVEM III peacekeeping operation fulfills its important responsibilities to provide a secure framework for the peace process.

The Lusaka Protocol has brought 17 months of peace, the longest peace period in Angola in over 30 years. As of April 30th, the United Nations reports that 24,819 UNITA personnel, representing about 40 percent of UNITA's claimed military forces, have disarmed and registered in nine U.N.-run quartering areas. Another 3,210 UNITA personnel are in pre-quartering areas waiting to register officially.

After their Libreville summit, President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi announced their agreement to quarter all UNITA troops, to form a joint senior military command, and to integrate UNITA forces into the national armed forces by the end of June.

They also agreed to form a Government of National Reconciliation by the end of July. President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi agreed to extend indefinitely the mandate for the current legislation and executive term to allow the Government of National Reconciliation and the National Assembly to play a constructive role in Angola's recovery and rehabilitation until elections can be held. President dos Santos also offered officially one of two vice presidencies to UNITA, an offer to which Dr. Savimbi promised to respond.

Events on the ground have not always kept pace with the promise of Libreville. The slow pace of the quartering process in late March and early April has been a particular concern. Our concerns have been eased somewhat by UNITA's commitment to Ambassadors Hare and Steinberg on April 25th to have a total of 30,000 troops disarmed and assembled by May 8. This commitment to restart the quartering process reflects UNITA's confidence that its concerns about security and supply problems in the quartering areas are being taken seriously and addressed constructively by the United Nations, which bears primary responsibility for overseeing the quartering process, and by the donors.

Indeed, close monitoring of the quartering areas will be essential to ensure that problems are promptly identified and addressed. Ambassador Hare has just returned from Angola and can discuss this issue in greater detail.

Nonetheless, we are deeply concerned by the slow pace of the peace process and have used every opportunity to impress on the parties the need to take advantage of this window of opportunity offered by the international community involvement. We fully expect both sides to bring a sense of urgency to their talks on remaining issues, including the details of military integration and the modalities of forming a Government of National Reconciliation, and to institute arrangements for amnesty in line with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and the commitments undertaken in Libreville.

We expect the parties to meet their commitment to the fullest extent possible, avoiding even the perception of subterfuge.

We promised the Angolans that if they took the difficult steps to negotiate a settlement, the United States would be their partner for peace. This fiscal year, we plan to make available \$105 million. This assistance will provide food and medicine to support communities traumatized by war and seeds and tools to allow farmers in one of Africa's most fertile countries to resume production.

We have provided more than \$5 million in support for the quartering areas, including shelter for former UNITA combatants and their families, health care, and civic education programs to prepare them for a peaceful future. Other programs will emphasize conflict resolution, strengthening civil institutions, and rehabilitating the rural communities to which demobilized soldiers and their families will return.

Recognizing the appalling price land mines exact on Angolan life, USAID Administrator Atwood and Senator Leahy have asked President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi to signal their commitment to peace by jointly destroying land mines from the respective stock piles.

It is my hope that Assistant Secretary Moose, who plans to travel to Angola later this month, will have the opportunity to witness this demonstration.

In fiscal year 1995, the U.S. Government provided more than \$8 million to non-governmental organizations carrying out demining and mine awareness training in Angola, including about \$4 million in Department of Defense.

We regret that our intention to commit a similar amount in fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense funds has been held up by new congressional restrictions limiting funding to operations with direct U.S. military participation and prohibiting the granting of these funds to non-governmental organizations. We hope these restrictions can be overcome.

Our assistance program is designed to be transitional in nature. Ultimately, Angola's recovery from decades of war and the realization of its tremendous economic potential depends not on foreign assistance but on the involvement of the domestic and international private sector.

The central focus of our policy in Angola remains the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the realization of a peaceful, democratic, and united Angola. The consolidation of peace will also require of all Angolans a deepening commitment to human rights and the strengthening of institutions essential to safeguarding those rights.

Madam Chairperson, the steps Angola has taken toward peace and reconciliation could not have been taken without U.S. leadership and U.S. engagement in Lusaka, during the negotiations and through our diplomatic presence in Angola. Our leadership in the U.N. Security Council, and our support for U.N. peacekeeping has allowed us to help end this war without putting U.S. troops on the ground. I mention this because our foreign affairs budget has been cut back over 50 percent in the last 10 years, and our assistance to Africa is in constant jeopardy.

Madam Chairperson, it is in our national interest to sustain our investment in Angola and our commitment to Africa. Our investment in the Angolan peace process is modest when we consider what is at stake: ending a vast humanitarian crisis, revitalizing the economy of our third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, and creating new opportunities for American business.

Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the Angolan peace process. Ambassador Hare and I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bushnell appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

About the timetable part of this process, what is the Administration's best estimate for the number of additional months that they will have to remain in Angola?

Ms. BUSHNELL. Madam Chairperson, the next few months are absolutely critical to the future of the peace process.

During the month of June, the militaries are to begin integration; and by the end of July, the government is to be turned into a Government of National Reconciliation.

That will then clear the way, particularly the integration of the military, for the demobilization, which, in turn, will clear the way for the reintegration of the soldiers into former communities and efforts to get Angola back on its feet.

So we are looking at the next 4 months as the most critical period.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In terms of the cost of the operation and cost sharing, how much have the Angolans themselves paid for the cost of this?

Have they provided anything to offset the cost of this expensive operation?

Ms. BUSHNELL. The Angolans have provided some in-kind contributions. They are so far in arrears.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What kind of in-kind contributions have they made?

Ms. BUSHNELL. They have provided some office space, logistical help. They have not provided monetary assistance.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And in terms of the oil revenues that they have, certainly it is billions of dollars that they must receive every year. Is it true that there have been reports that these revenues are unaccounted for? And where do you think that it is going?

Ms. BUSHNELL. The oil revenues have been mortgaged now. When it comes to unaccounted revenues, I cannot tell you where it has been going because the process is not transparent enough. The issue of corruption is one that concerns us greatly and one that we have spoken to the Angolan Government about—all Angolans about, particularly in relationship to the assistance that we hope to provide them. Clearly it is not in our interest to provide assistance unless there is transparent accounting.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And about the offer of the vice presidency, why do you think that Dr. Savimbi has not accepted this offer?

Ms. BUSHNELL. It is our understanding that Dr. Savimbi is concerned about the substance of the office. I think he would like to have an office that has true responsibilities. And it is my understanding that it is the nature of those responsibilities that are under discussion.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In these critical 4 months that await us, what is our projection for the increased cost to the American taxpayers for the additional, then, months after that or perhaps years of U.N. peacekeepers in Angola? Do you have any projections as to how much it is going to cost?

Ms. BUSHNELL. You mentioned that the peacekeeping is costing \$350 million a year, of which we have been paying 30.8 percent; and that goes down to 25 percent in this fiscal year and beyond. It is certainly not our intention to have peacekeepers remain in Angola forever, absolutely not.

This is why, on the other hand, to remove them before peace has come and we have a foundation on which the Angolan people can

build tomorrow is going to waste the money that we have spent to date.

This is why the last mandate for peacekeeping was limited to 3 months. It is up on May 8th. I expect that it will continue to be limited so that we can continue to look very closely at the progress that is being made and indicate to the Angolans that they have an opportunity here that is not limitless.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Now, at what point do you think that we will decide that our goals will not be met and that it is time to withdraw from this effort?

Ms. BUSHNELL. I think there is a decent beginning. I do not want to say there is a wonderful beginning, because clearly everybody knows that the quartering of troops has been slow and there have been other problems.

On the other hand, I do not think we should make lightly of the fact that 17 months of peace in a conflict that has lasted 30 years is a good beginning. The fact that there are 24,000 UNITA troops that have been quartered and the promise of 6,000 more within the next couple of weeks is a good beginning.

The fact that we have very clear dates, June and July, in which some critical advances are to be made is a beginning. So given that, I think it is premature to talk about cutting loose.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Another item about the costs involved has been the operations to remove mines. There was an article that said it costs about \$2,400 per acre for this demining operation. There has been some discussion about whether those who are responsible for putting the mines in the first place will be held responsible, then, for removing them. It seems that we have taken this on as part of our U.S. responsibility.

Could you comment on that?

Ms. BUSHNELL. The demining process has saved thousands of lives, and I would hesitate to put a price tag on the value of human life.

Not only has it saved lives, but I mentioned in the testimony that Angola is a very fertile country. Clearing the grounds of land mines is going to enable people to begin to develop some self-sufficiency, get back to work and get their country back to work.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is there any thought to sealing off this area, these mine areas, and encouraging the population to move elsewhere?

They have a relatively low population density.

Ms. BUSHNELL. The mines are all over the place, so it is very difficult to simply seal off an area.

Now, there has been a lot of mine-awareness training; and the result of that has been very, very successful in bringing down the numbers of people who have been maimed by the mines.

And what I personally have seen mine clearing exercises doing is to first keep the villagers away from the areas that are mined and then allow them to come in behind to begin to clear the land for cultivation afterwards.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And just one more question.

There have been some reports that tents and other supplies provided by the United Nations are inadequate. What are the physical

conditions of the U.N. camps where UNITA forces are supposed to live?

Ms. BUSHNELL. I would like to ask Paul Hare to address that since he was in the camps just last week and I think can give you a first-hand report.

Ambassador HARE. Madam Chairperson, the condition of the quartering areas, 10 of them, effectively, are open at this point, 10 out of a projected 15.

To me, it has been a most remarkable accomplishment because they have been established in very remote, and often inaccessible, areas. So it has been a remarkable logistical feat on the part of the United Nation.

With respect to the actual conditions of the camp, I think what also has happened is that people have learned lessons from the earlier experiences, particularly the first four quartering areas. The ones that I visited most recently showed those improvements, including the quality of the tentage. There has been a lot of talk about the poor quality of some tents, particularly the ones that came from Pakistan. That has been rectified in part by putting additional fly sheaths over the tents so that you have sort of a double coverage.

But in any event, in terms of housing, this is very much a temporary operation; and I would underline what the Acting Assistant Secretary said, we have got to really make a lot of progress in finishing up this process in the next, I would say, 4 or 5 months because we are now entering the dry season and the process should be completed before the onslaught of the next rainy season.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Before I recognize Congressman Hastings, I would like to point out that in the audience today is Reverend Dabinga, the president of the Pan African Council who is here with some of his conferees.

Welcome. I heard that your conference went very well today. Congratulations.

And also Ambassador Franca of Angola was here with us earlier. Thank you.

Congressman Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.

Madam Secretary and Ambassador, thank you both very much. And let me not only commend you but all of the efforts that have been put forward in restoring peace to Angola, a place that has had 30 years of civil strife; and 30 months is not going to overcome extraordinary difficulties.

As a followup to the Chairwoman's queries having to do with demining, is there anything that we can do—meaning those of us that are policymakers—that will assist in freeing up the funding that might assist in this effort?

My understanding is, from your testimony, that we now have spent or are spending close to \$8 million; but that some funds are presently held up.

Can you give me somewhat of a status report regarding that and what, if anything, we can do in that regard?

I do not want to rattle on; but if I liken it, for example, to Bosnia, it is minuscule by comparison to the amount of money that

we have already spent and other countries have already spent in demining in Bosnia. And I might add I support that effort.

But here we know for a fact that one of the things that will cause investors and others not to be able to assist in the developing of the infrastructure is if the mines are going to be there.

So what can we do? What do you suggest that we do, first, to free those funds up? And, second, to encourage other donor countries to get involved in this particular process?

Ms. BUSHNELL. Congressman Hastings, you do, indeed, raise a very good point on the mines. No one knows exactly how many mines there are in Angola, but at one point I heard the figure of about a mine per person, which is absolutely outrageous.

I mentioned in my testimony that because of recent congressional legislation, we find ourselves in a Catch-22 position. We had thought we had available to us some FY 96 Department of Defense demining funds. Those are now no longer available to us because of the limitations of the FY 96 National Defense Authorization Act on use of demining funds.

Now, one of the realities is that there is no U.S. military presence in Angola. We have managed to do, I think, a wonderful job. And we, the United States, have maintained a leadership and partnership with the United Nations, and that is fine. But the amount of money that is now available for demining is significantly lessened. It forces us to look at humanitarian assistance funds and bilateral funds to use for demining.

Well, that means that we are going to have to look at some cost offsets that are very, very difficult to do. Of course, it is important to demine it; it is also important to keep the food going to people who need the food. It is also important to continue development. But you cannot develop until you demine.

And we are essentially siphoning off the efforts and our policy objectives by this kind of limitation.

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, I certainly can appreciate that. And, in my view, it is particularly shortsighted on our behalf not to be able to invest in trying to demine the area.

Or even more importantly, one of the reasons, as you put it, that the cutoff occurred with reference to NGO's seems, to my way of thinking, to be equally shortsighted. The NGO's on the ground are doing the work and in the final analysis need to be able to be mobile and therefore need to be able to demine. I sometimes wonder aloud and privately as to what kind of policies we are trying to establish.

That said, I know you cannot cover everything, Madam Secretary. The Congo, Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia also have a vital interest in addition to their concerns in intracountry from a standpoint of refugees and other matters.

What is the relationship in the surrounding area, more specifically as it pertains to refugees?

And I know you did not cover that in your prepared testimony, but I am just curious, for example, is Namibia affected, is the Congo affected in any way by refugee problems at all?

And I am asking for information. I simply do not know.

Ms. BUSHNELL. I do not think that the impact of the refugee problems on those surrounding countries has been as devastating as it is in other parts of Africa.

Certainly the number of Angolan refugees in Zaire does not even compare with the high number of Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

What is terribly important to us is the status of displaced persons within Angola and what their future is.

Somebody just passed me a note to say that there are about 300,000 refugees in surrounding countries, most in Zaire. But, again, when you compare to other kinds of refugees, it really is a minuscule number.

Mr. HASTINGS. Exactly.

I want to ask one final question, Madam Chairperson.

Madam Chairperson had covered in her question the UNITA position with reference to the vice presidency. But I am curious about the linkage that the UNITA leader makes to the peace process with reference to some of the demands that are put forward, namely the introduction of an amnesty law and a greater transparency and a government implementation of the peace accord.

And I am just curious as to your comments in that regard.

Ms. BUSHNELL. The amnesty, I think, is critical to the integration of the two militaries.

The issue of the amnesty particularly concerns those senior military people who had joined the government military and then left when the civil war started up again; there is nothing in the current amnesty law that forgives those who left after the war started up.

It is not, as I understand, a critical issue. We are expecting that this amnesty will pass very soon, that President dos Santos will make a public announcement about it. That, in turn, will enable the senior military people from UNITA to begin integrating the one military.

That will then be critical to bringing in other more junior members of the UNITA military.

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, I certainly want to compliment you and wish you well on your new posting and yet another challenging country when you get to Kenya. But assuredly, those of you involved in this process have done us proud in our country, and I thank you.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Thank you, Congressman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Congressman Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I am just a little bit confused. I came in a little bit late, but I see from your testimony, Madam Secretary, that you said in the second paragraph: "Angola is on the verge of a genuine lasting peace."

And yet I hear that the government in Luanda has withdrawn from the peacemaking process. I mean, is that right? Is it not? I mean, where do we come together here? I would just like to sort of spell it out in very simple terms.

And I am sorry I was not here earlier for your testimony.

Ms. BUSHNELL. It is not our impression that anyone has withdrawn from the peace process, Congressman, neither the parties nor the partners in peace.

It is absolutely true that we have gone through a period that has been very slow and frustrating. Those of us who have engaged in peace processes and peace processes in Africa know that any conflict that has lasted as long as this one has is not going to be solved quickly.

I think that the amount of distrust and suspicion that has been built up over an entire generation of war—there are people who have been born and have known nothing but war, adults, people in their prime who have known nothing but distrust and suspicion—to suddenly turn the page in that chapter of history is going to take time.

I think on the one hand we can understand that it will take time. I think on the other hand, we need to also be very strong in telling all of the parties that there is a limited window of opportunity, our understanding goes only so far.

There are very encouraging signs, particularly recently. 24,000 UNITA troops are in the quartering areas. Dr. Savimbi has promised another 6,000 by the 8th of May, bringing them up to 30,000, which is about 50 percent of the UNITA troops. So I am not at all about to say that the peace process has failed. Slow, yes. But ongoing, yes.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Fine. Thank you very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Congressman Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.

First of all, Madam Ambassador, I am very optimistic; and congratulations.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Thank you, sir. I am not yet confirmed. But I am hopeful.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, hope springs eternal. And you will do a great job. You have got a real challenge, and I wish you well.

Madam Chairperson, without Ambassador Hare, there would not have been a peace agreement. You heard of the spy who came in from the cold. This is the ambassador who they brought back from retirement.

And how many years, Ambassador, have you been Special Envoy?

Ambassador HARE. Two and a half years, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. How many trips have you made to Angola?

Ambassador HARE. Well, the first part was negotiating in Lusaka. But since the Lusaka Agreement, I have spent about 6 months in Angola on separate visits.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, I want to thank you. I was a pessimist. I did not think you could do it. I am most grateful.

Let me read just part of your testimony, and Congressman Hastings has alluded to it, too: "We regret that our intention to commit a similar amount of DOD fiscal year 1996 funds have been held up by new congressional restrictions."

Specifically, what piece of legislation was that?

There have been a lot of restrictions in bills that have been vetoed. And I was just wondering, was it a rider on an appropriations bill?

Ms. BUSHNELL. Congressman, I do not have the answer to that. Let me get back to you on that.

[The reply from Ms. Bushnell follows:]

The FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, unlike the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, moved the land mine clearance program to Section 401 of U.S.C. Title 10. The inclusion of demining activities in Section 401 ipso facto imposed new restrictions on DOD support for demining in Angola and many other countries. A reinstatement of the FY 1995 language would remove those limitations.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. Because I thought a lot of that had been cleaned up by vetoes, if you really want to know the truth. I did not know if it was somehow in a continuing resolution.

Ambassador Hare.

Ambassador HARE. I would just like to add an interesting footnote on this point. I just read a letter from Dr. Savimbi to Senator Leahy who, of course, has been a leading proponent in the land mine business and particularly in advocating this joint government/UNITA explosion of stockpiles.

And in the letter in which Dr. Savimbi committed himself to Senator Leahy's proposal, he mentioned specifically about this particular prohibition and asked him if something could not be done about that situation because it was a concern to UNITA.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I have an observation. When Vice President Gore went there, he stated that he was looking at a mango tree and none of the mangos were picked; and around the area were children in early stages of malnutrition because they could not get from here to there for fear of having their legs blown off because everything was mined.

They had the sophistication of laying the mines, Madam Chairperson, but they did not have the sophistication of removing them. I think that has been one of the big problems.

Mr. Ambassador, can I drive from Luanda to Humabo now?

Ambassador HARE. You can drive. Unfortunately, as you know, we had two U.N. peacekeepers killed along with an NGO worker from OXFAM on the road—well, it might be dangerous in other words. You would have to be careful on the roads. But the roads are opening up slowly.

Mr. JOHNSTON. There is a freedom of access around the country that was not there a year ago?

Ambassador HARE. It is not satisfactory, but it is a gradual process.

Mr. JOHNSTON. How many U.N. troops are there in this country today?

Ambassador HARE. Over 7,000. I mean, that is total, peacekeepers and observers.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Who is the largest U.N. contributor of personnel? What country?

Ambassador HARE. Either India or Brazil. They both have about 1,000 men each in Angola.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Have there been any casualties to any troop contribution that you know of?

Ambassador HARE. No. There have been deaths, but it is from malaria and things of that sort.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Are there any American U.N. advisors in the country?

Ambassador HARE. I have seen them. I could not tell you if they are there right at the moment. But they have been there as observers, not as part of the peacekeeping unit.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Just merely observers?

Ambassador HARE. Yes. But not out in the field. In Luanda.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Do they have a Constitution now?

Ambassador HARE. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK, that is what the Government of National Reconciliation is operating under?

Ambassador HARE. The Lusaka Protocol was not a constitutional or constituent assembly so to speak. But there were certain sorts of suggestions or markers that were put down in the Lusaka Protocol with respect to say the concept of decentralization or suggestions about the national anthem being changed, the flag being changed and so on.

But nothing was prescribed. We could not do that in terms of negotiations.

Mr. JOHNSTON. When are the next Presidential elections?

Ambassador HARE. Well, basically, according to the Lusaka Protocol, the Presidential elections would be determined when the conditions have been considered appropriate by the U.N. special representative in consultation with the parties. In other words, some time in the future.

The more immediate question was the question of election to the national assembly, which its mandate expires later this year in November. And at Libreville, as I believe was mentioned in the testimony, the two parties agreed that that would be postponed, a position I totally agree with, not that I am against the elections but it would clearly be counterproductive at this point.

Mr. JOHNSTON. When do you anticipate the next Presidential election? Do you have any dart that you can throw at a calendar?

Ambassador HARE. It would be a pure guess. I would not think, myself—this is personal; it has nothing to do with the government's position—I do not think we will see elections in Angola for a couple of years. And perhaps it will start out with elections at the local level, for example, the municipal level. That would be an approach that I would personally favor. Then they could have assembly elections and the Presidential election. That is just purely personal.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

I know that you have to leave, but if I could ask you just to stay around for Congressman Payne's questions because he rearranged his schedule to make sure that he was with us today. Thank you.

Congressman Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And I will try to brief.

Let me, once again, commend the chairperson for calling this important hearing and keeping the African Subcommittee informed on issues that are very important to the continent and also to the United States and peace.

Let me just very quickly say that I would really like to commend both of you, too, for the outstanding work that you have done in Angola.

Of course, being a long-time follower of activities in Africa, I have always felt that perhaps we could have been supportive to An-

gola when they were fighting for independence. You know some of these problems began many years ago. And as we know, one of our NATO allies, Portugal, was suppressing the will of the people in Angola by keeping the colonial powers to be. And that begins the whole story of: Your enemy is my enemy and my friend is your friend.

And I think, unfortunately, many potential allies that we could have had on the continent of Africa during the cold war were on the other side because that was the only people that would support their quest for independence at the time.

And so I always paraphrase that when we get into the recent history in Angola. And that is why I was a strong supporter of the recognition of Angola knowing the history of the Angolan people; both UNITA and MPLA and other organizations fighting against the Portuguese colonial powers up until they did get independence. And, of course, then the cold war factor, getting involved, not only there but Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea and Cape Verde and on and on.

So having said that, I have a question regarding the mine problems. How much resources have been allocated to the question of attempting to eliminate the land mines? Is it a major thrust in the country by agencies of the United Nations or other organizations?

Ms. BUSHNELL. Congressman, I can talk about our contributions. The total amount of resources, United Nations plus other bilateral donors, is a figure that is not available to me at this time; although, we can research it if you would like.

Aside from the \$8 million that I have talked about, we are looking in this fiscal year at providing \$2 million in foreign military financing—that is now problematic—as well as \$8.5 million in quick impact projects. And among those will be demining efforts, again so that we can get the mines out of the fields so that people can begin planting and producing for themselves.

Ambassador HARE. I just might add that it is an international effort. We, I think, are taking the leading role. But there is a South African firm, Mekan, that is involved in land clearing particularly. There is the Norwegian People's Aid that is involved; Halo Trust, which is a British outfit, as well as a German demining group.

So there are more than just ourselves.

Ms. BUSHNELL. If I may add, Congressman, among the assistance that we are giving is \$4.5 million for prostheses.

Mr. PAYNE. That is really very, very important.

In my city of Newark, when I was a member of the municipal council, we invited children to come to our city and our university of medicine and dentistry and Newark provided care for free. We were able to get the local hotels to put these youngsters up. Because, as you know, that is the largest number of amputees per population, especially with children, in the world.

I have another question. There was a recent world conference on the ending of the use of land mines. Was the year 2010 that they are supposed to be illegal? Do you recall what the year is? And why are they waiting so long? I mean, what was the rationale for another 15 years to get it started? Do you know?

Ms. BUSHNELL. You are talking about our position here?

Mr. PAYNE. No. I know our position—I hope it has been that we oppose it. But why was it that the agreement was that it would be 15 years or 12 years before they would be officially outlawed? Do you know?

Ms. BUSHNELL. I think that there is discussion about the military purpose for land mines, the fact that there are militaries who believe that they have a very useful purpose, particularly since there are such things as, I think they are called, intelligent land mines, that is, mines that blow themselves—or at least destroy themselves after a certain amount of time.

So there is not an international consensus yet that land mines are so destructive to civilian life that they should be banned quickly.

Mr. PAYNE. OK. I cannot understand. I will not even bother you with that.

Ms. BUSHNELL. I am not the expert on land mines.

Mr. PAYNE. Right. Let me go on to another quick question, and finally, because we do have a vote.

And, Ms. Chairperson, I will come back if the other panel will be here.

Just quickly, we find that there is a demilitarization interest not only in Angola but in places like Mozambique and Eritrea and Uganda. One of the problems, of course, is to get the gun. You usually have to give something, some seed, some land, some training, a job.

Have we focused on programs, either one of you, to try to give to the former men in the bush and the former military, both UNITA and MPLA, some program where we can demilitarize and have them move into productive services?

Ms. BUSHNELL. We have been providing seeds and tools to military people who are choosing to go home.

That is also very much the focus of these quick impact projects that I was talking about. We have a team in Angola right now that is looking particularly at four areas in which there was the greatest amount of fighting to rehabilitate those areas through revitalization programs that will attract people formerly in the military.

So, yes, indeed, that is absolutely critical to any de-mobilization process. These are people whose identities and skills are tied up in being soldiers. They do not know how to be anything else. Literally, they have not been anything else. And we are very aware of how much we need to help them turn around their identity and give them something to do, give them skills other than the skills of soldiering.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

One more question for Congressman Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. Just an observation while Congressman Payne is here.

Secretary Bushnell opened up the hearing, at the request of the Chair, to report briefly on Liberia and the surrounding countries.

Congressman Payne and I were in Ghana when Jerry Rawlings just took over as chair of ECOMOG. He begged us for two helicopters. He said that with just some symbol from the U.S. Government, he felt that he could resolve a lot of the problems in Liberia.

And now we look at the cost of sending in the Marines. It is an ounce of prevention.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Thank you so much. Much success to you.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. When we reconvene the subcommittee, we will hear from the second panel.

The subcommittee will stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee is once again in session.

Our second panel is composed of two very knowledgeable witnesses who have dedicated many years to issues pertaining to Angola and the peace process. Both have also made recent trips to Angola, having spoken with many of the principles.

First to speak will be Mr. Bruce McCollm, who is currently the president of the Institute for Democratic Strategies. He has held numerous posts in his distinguished career, including: president of the International Republican Institute; director of the Committee for New Investment in South Africa; and executive director and deputy director of Freedom House where, among his other responsibilities, he coordinated the Freedom House Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties from 1989 to 1993. Mr. McCollm has monitored over three dozen elections in transition societies. Through the Institute for Democratic Strategies, he is currently involved in Kenya, South Africa, Angola, and soon in Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique. He has written extensively on subjects ranging from human rights to trends in global democracies.

Mr. McCollm will be followed by Dr. Gerald Bender, who is a professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California at Los Angeles. Professor Bender was the Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California from 1986 to 1991. Previously, he taught African politics in the departments of Political Science at UCLA and the University of California, San Diego. He has served on the Board of Directors of the African Studies Association and as the Association's president from 1985 to 1986. He has received fellowships from various foundations to conduct research on Africa and has been published in numerous academic journals.

We welcome our witnesses for the second panel, and we thank them in advance for their testimony.

Mr. McCollm.

STATEMENT OF R. BRUCE MCCOLLM, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES

Mr. MCCOLLM. Madam Chairperson, thank you very much for this opportunity to address the subcommittee.

I believe your hearing today is very important for us to keep focused on this important issue. We are talking, after all, about the peaceful resolution of the longest civil war in African history.

I have to say up front that I am probably more than a cautious optimist about the process. Once the new deadlines were put in place for the U.N. involvement, I think it focused attention, on both sides, about the need for timely compliance.

I believe that two leaders have reached an understanding that this process is the only show in town, however flawed it is, for them to reach a point of national reconciliation and democratization.

And since the beginning of the year—and I must commend the Administration on their efforts since the beginning of the year in terms of their even-handed approach, especially the introduction of people like Brian Atwood and Madeleine Albright into the process, that I believe there has been significant progress to report.

We hear all the time, last week for instance, that the Angolan Government withdrew from the military commission. However, my understanding is that the government is back on board; UNITA, for its part, has agreed to quarter a total of 30,000 troops by May 8th. However, of course, they may freeze the garrison process unless the government pulls the national army back from its forward positions.

But let me make some personal comments. I believe the political will inside Angola is there for this process to succeed. However, outside pressure is needed on a constant basis, and American leadership is absolutely essential for this process to work.

Many of the agreements within the Lusaka Protocol realistically will not be implemented; and we ought to be aware of that now. Disarming the civil population will be incredibly difficult, even after the formation of a national unity government.

The government, for reasons that remain sort of unknown to the outside worlds, still purchases large amounts of weapons—whether they are militarily important or significant, I do not know—and the removal of mercenaries from Angola, even though the government has outlawed one of the outfits, Executive Outcomes, is problematic and has been problematic historically in Angolan history. Many of these people seem to be having security functions for oil and mining interests.

And then we come to the—if you are aware of the old Alfred Hitchcock films, there is a thing in the plot device called the “maguffin”. The maguffin is a thing that has no intrinsic value; however, it keeps the plot going. And in this particular instance, I believe it is the vice presidency.

It is clear that there has been progress made on this issue, but I think we have to step back and realize the vice presidency, with the agreement of Dr. Savimbi, was offered to UNITA. UNITA has accepted one of the two vice presidencies.

What now is under discussion is what added dimensions to the vice presidency could attract Dr. Savimbi for accepting it. I think that there are basic—even though Dr. Savimbi may opt not to become vice president, clearly by having a UNITA vice president, this would be in the accord of the Lusaka Protocols.

Even so, both President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi have discussed in great detail the nature of the vice presidency; and I also understand that UNITA, now, has put forward a new proposal that there be two executive vice presidencies with considerable power and separate portfolios under the direction of the President. That is under serious discussions by both sides, and I think there would be a peaceful resolution of this.

There has been movement on the broader amnesty law, and I cannot undervalue how important that is for the integration of the army. As stated earlier, one of the earlier witnesses said that it was crucial for there to be integration of UNITA's high command into the national army that the 1992 amnesty law be broad.

That, as we speak, is being discussed on both sides. And it seems that that will occur.

We should mention only in the last couple of months, there has been agreement on the integration of the armed forces and the inclusion with names specified of UNITA into the high command. That is a plus.

There has been an agreement, since the March 1st Libreville summit of UNITA into the government by June or July, but realistically let us say September. Real names have been submitted for these positions. And UNITA has now tabled a proposal to put some time limits on the review of the Constitution. Both sides are discussing what constitutional revisions need to be done.

There has been partial success in garrisoning soldiers. And only recently the government appears to have withdrawn from some forward positions that has encouraged UNITA to resume its garrisoning efforts.

As you recall the Washington Post article on the Wild West nature of the diamond mines, there seems to be some mutual agreement on policing the diamond-producing region.

And there has been headway made in the last several months on the exchange of prisoners.

There are remaining obstacles, I believe. One is that the everyday reality of UNITA soldiers is still not adequate. Despite the testimony we heard this morning—and I agree that some changes have been made since I was over there in February—the fact of the matter is that many of the promises of integrating UNITA personnel into civilian life have not been kept.

The European Community and the Portuguese Government made a promise in March to establish vocational training programs as well as programs to inventory the skills of UNITA soldiers. This has not occurred yet.

There is a real probability of increased desertion from camps where UNITA soldiers are.

There seems to be a need for civic education among the soldiers because they are basically there because President Savimbi asked them to be there.

I think another fact that we need to underline is that UNITA has yet to become a legalized party. Part of that is because the national legislature has not met. That needs to be taken care of either by Presidential decree or some time when the new Congress meets.

If those areas are addressed, I believe the rest of the peace process will fall into place. I still believe, though, that peace will only be reality at the local and provincial level. And there none of the discussions have been taken into consideration, some of the practical problems of administering a government in the war-torn areas.

So I would urge that our aid moneys be put in—and their aid country strategy I think is a very good one—at the local level, by-

passing the national level, to encourage the development of NGO structures as well as municipal government structures.

And there is a last dimension that Ambassador Hare raised about the Lusaka Protocols at some time we are going to have to face, is that it does call for a runoff of the 1992 Presidential elections.

In my discussions with Dr. Savimbi, there seems to be no need for such a runoff, there is a recognition that President dos Santos is the President. There is a concern at least raised. And there was a proposal raised by the MPLA to reintroduce electoral politics at the local level.

And I think these options are more favorable than if we went back to what I believe would entail another national catastrophe.

With increased American attention to the process and a realistic view of our timeframes for implementation, I think we will see a successful process come to conclusion.

But I think we have to be realistic. We have to remember that there are many sort of on-the-ground realities that are creating these delays, as well as some serious political differences. These are two forces that have been at war for almost a generation. There is not a high degree of trust, particularly at the middle level, between the former belligerence; and we must encourage that in terms of our own active role, in which the Congress plays an awfully important part.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McColm appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Professor Bender.

STATEMENT OF GERALD BENDER, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

Mr. BENDER. Thank you very much.

When I began my testimony last July, I started with an assertion, when you held your hearings, that the Angolan predicament was soluble. And I contrasted it with other ethnic conflicts around the world, the conflicts that involved ethnic groups. And in just looking at this period since your last hearing and now, we see that in most of these other ethnic conflicts, including Liberia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Rwanda, situations deteriorated there. But in Angola it has improved.

Yet Angola is still a long way from building the requisite foundation for a lasting peace. The missing ingredient in Angola continues to be a fundamental lack of trust, not only lack of trust on the part of the leaders of the Angolan Government and UNITA toward each other, but perhaps more importantly insufficient trust on the part of the Angolan people as well as the international community with respect to the actions and intentions of the top officials in both UNITA and the MPLA.

Having said this, however, I want to clarify that I personally believe that the peace train in Angola is moving squarely along the tracks and will ultimately arrive at the station. Moreover, the further it advances, the more difficult it is for either side to turn that

train around. Extremists both within and outside of Angola, however, could derail that train.

There is little that we as Americans do about any potential extremists in Angola, but we can certainly, and should certainly, do everything possible to make sure that nobody in the U.S. Congress, U.S. Government, or public at large take any actions that could derail the peace process in Angola.

It has become almost a national pastime over the past quarter century in the United States for Americans to divide along partisan lines and point fingers of accusation at one side or another in Angola. I hope that this obsession with finger pointing has come to an end and, instead, we can seek to find ways to help Angolans bridge their mutual suspicions and differences.

There is sufficient finger pointing in Angola to suffice for the entire world. Angolans appear to have raised the practice of accusation to a new art form. Almost daily one side accuses the other of bad faith or of taking actions that are detrimental to the peace process. It is to be expected at this stage of the process—after decades of war, when mutual suspicions remain high, and when both sides engage in considerable posturing and half-measures—that Angolan political discourse would be consumed with continued accusations and finger pointing. What I am suggesting is that here in the United States we try to avoid exacerbating these understandable suspicions and attempt to assist the Angolan leaders and people to find new areas of trust and cooperation.

Today's hearing is one way by which Members of Congress can become further engaged in helping Angola toward peace. Yet, it should be noted that there is a noticeable lack of interest and activity by the House Committee on International Relations compared with the past. I made the same observation in March of this year when I testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. I think the point is worth making.

And, basically—and I will not read this—but the point is that since Ambassador Donald Steinberg arrived in Angola now almost a year ago, he has not received one visit from a congressional delegation or even a staff delegation.

Now, compared to the past where you had Members of Congress and especially their staff pouring into Angola, it is a remarkable and noticeable and, I would say, concerning difference.

And I know that while it is not as sexy a process when you are running to help fuel the war as it is to try to stop a war and build trust, but I would hope that members of this committee and their staff would at least have enough interest in Angola to pay a visit there. I am sure you could learn a lot.

And, in fact, it is in mark contrast because ironically in the past it was always difficult to get members of an Administration to go to Angola. Yet, here you have got, as has been pointed out, so many members of this Administration have been there, from Brian Atwood, Madeliene Albright, George Moose, General Jamerson, Paul Hare, and even the visit last December of President dos Santos here to Washington, it shows that this Administration is deeply engaged in the peace process; and I would certainly hope that this committee and Members of Congress would get in step with the Administration to try and contribute to that process.

Now, let us turn to Angola and the steps that I think are necessary for peace.

There are some immediate steps that both the Angolan Government and UNITA need to take to move the process forward to the next plateau. UNITA must increase the speed of quartering its troops and significantly improve on the quality of the soldiers and weapons that are showing up at the camps. One must applaud the commitment that Jonas Savimbi gave last week to the U.S. Ambassador to Angola, Donald Steinberg and Ambassador Hare to improve in all these areas—especially his pledge to include artillery and tanks among the weapons and to achieve up to 35–40,000 troops by May 8th. We now await delivery on his promise. UNITA's record of unfulfilled promises to deliver its troops and weapons under UNAVEM II and III has given new meaning to the phrase "seeing is believing".

The government, for its part, must actually carry out its declarations on the removal of all mercenaries on its side and quartering of the special rapid intervention force. The latter are still quartered in only 8 of 10 sites in the country. Furthermore, government troops must withdraw to barracks sufficiently distant from the UNITA camps. This is an area where there has been some slippage as of late. It is also imperative that President dos Santos declare a general amnesty so that UNITA officers who left the FAA in October 1992 can be assured that they will not be arrested as deserters when they are reincorporated into the FAA over the next few months.

The government should also begin to take immediate steps in the economic arena that, while not directly related to the peace process, would contribute significantly to restoring economic and social stability in the country, which is necessary for peace to obtain in Angola. The problem in Angola used to be that many people had money but there was a scarcity of products to buy. Today, the situation is just the opposite: one can find most products available in Luanda but few people have the money to buy them.

Runaway inflation has literally wiped out the middle class and moved Angola closer to a two-class society of the very rich and the very poor. Printing larger denominations of bills certainly helps avoid the necessity of carrying a briefcase full of money to buy a meal but it does not address the problem of inflation. It is not surprising that the IMF has adopted the posture of all but ignoring Angola until the leadership produces coherent and meaningful economic plans.

Corruption in the Angolan Government appears to be rising almost as fast as inflation. Top officials in Washington and Western Europe now consider Angola to be among the most corrupt countries in Africa, on a par with Nigeria and Zaire, although I am not sure we can still put Zaire in that list since I do not think there is anything left to steal.

But one can expect to see an increase in the strikes that have recently plagued the country. It is not realistic for the Angolan Government to exhort professionals, such as doctors and teachers—who recently went on strike—to make greater sacrifices when they earn the equivalent of \$1 a month and they see the pool of funds

that could increase their salaries diverted to foreign accounts of many of those who are demanding their sacrifice.

Unless there is a dramatic improvement in the economy of the country, Angola will be unable to achieve meaningful peace. Margaret Anstee, who is the former U.N. Special Representative in Angola from 1991 to 1993, stated the dilemma eloquently in a recent letter to the editor of the Financial Times where she stated:

Angola finds itself in a cleft stick. Without economic revival and genuine prospects of a decent livelihood for the thousands of soldiers who have to be absorbed into civilian life, the peace agreement signed in Lusaka in November 1994 will remain fragile. And without some acceleration of the painfully slow progress in implementing that agreement, public confidence that the war is really over will remain low, and the climate unfavorable to reconstruction, investment, and development.

Angola is just always full of rumors and conspiratorial theories. I mean, really even back to my first visits in colonial times, there have always been, every day, two or three juicy rumors that one was bombarded with. But one particular conspiratorial theory seems to have a certain persistence, and I would just like to lay it out and maybe you could help dispel it.

There is a widespread belief on both sides—although I think more on the government side—that the question of war and peace in Angola will hinge on the outcome of the U.S. elections in November. In essence, the assumption is that if Bob Dole were elected, the U.S. Government would provide UNITA with sufficient military equipment to return to war and perhaps defeat the Angolan Government and if Bill Clinton were re-elected, the U.S. Government would eschew all war options and remain committed to supporting the peace process.

I find myself continually having to respond to this. Just recently I have given two interviews to Angolan radio stations, one to the BBC—actually two to the BBC, one in English, one in Portuguese—where this is the main question that I am asked. And Ambassador Steinberg recently went on Angolan TV to dismiss it and tried to clarify that there is no basis in reality at all for this; but the rumor goes on.

I think one of the reasons is that it has a certain seductiveness to it, namely that, as with any good conspiratorial theory, you know, it has an explanation for everything. You know, why is it that UNITA is not moving faster in the camps? Why are they not turning in their weapons? Obviously because they are waiting for Bob Dole to be elected so they can go back to war.

Why is the government still importing arms, say from places like Brazil? It is because they are afraid that if Bob Dole is elected, the United States will begin to re-arm UNITA and they will need the arms when they go back to war, et cetera. It goes on and on.

But, you know, my response has been to deny them; and I have argued that the U.S. Government and Congress is strongly committed in a bipartisan way and a genuine way, too, to peace; and moreover that I do not hear any rumblings in the Dole camp about favoring any kind of return to war.

I just do not see any support in the United States for any move that would put the United States in the role as patron to support some group fighting to overthrow a new Government of National Reconciliation in Angola.

But I do think it would be helpful if you and your colleagues could clarify once and for all the spurious nature of this conspiratorial theory. There would be no better way to do this than to demonstrate bipartisan cooperation and support for the peace process in Angola.

During recent Senate hearings on Angola, it would have been impossible for any outsider to identify the party affiliation of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on their questions or comments. There was not the slightest hint of favoring return to war or of even providing UNITA with lethal aid again. I trust that the same message will emerge unambiguously from this committee and from others in the House.

One area in which this committee might begin to demonstrate its bipartisan commitment would be to correct the serious flaw in the otherwise commendable law covering U.S. Government support for demining. And here again, I independently, not knowing that this was going to be put in other testimony, I made the same point; and I might be able to clarify some of the questions—I guess it was Congressman Johnston—but about the nature of the law and why we cannot spend the money.

Finally let me just conclude on a couple of thoughts.

One reason why it is easy to forge a bipartisan American policy in support of peace in Angola is that it is not only good for Angola but it is good for American business.

Peace is already generating prosperity for the United States. Take, for example, the area of Soyo in northern Angola. Two years ago, UNITA overran the town and destroyed tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment and infrastructure, thus halting the Texaco operations in Soyo.

Government attacks in this area last December threatened to seriously undermine President dos Santos' visit to the White House.

Now that peace has returned to Soyo, Texaco and its partners will soon be pumping 35,000 to 40,000 barrels of oil a day. This production, when you combined with the increase in Chevron's production in Cabinda, will result in an increase of revenues for American corporations of between \$300 and \$400 million a year.

Furthermore, the Angolan Council of Ministers recently approved concessionary rights for two new American oil companies to enter into Angolan oil exploration. Amoco and Mobil will become operators of two new blocks this year. Citibank is in the process of opening an office in Angola, and Coca-Cola is about to set up a plant. The California-based Mampeza is in the process of modernizing and expanding its tuna, mackerel, and sardine processing facilities in Benguela, Angola. Mampeza, which has been operating a minimal capacity over the past two decades, attributes its exciting prospects to peace and to the vital assistance from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.

Peace also means greater security for the more than \$3 billion already invested by American companies and helps assure opportunities for many others that are waiting in the wings to invest more money in the future.

Madam Chairperson and members of the committee, peace in Angola is not only possible but probable. Yet it needs all the help that can be mobilized in Angola, the United States, and the rest of the

world. I trust that all of you will commit yourselves to this noble effort.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bender appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Gentlemen, to you both, there have been persistent reports of continued arms delivery to Angola. Who are the armed suppliers and purchasers? What type of weapons are entering the country? Why are weapon purchases continuing? And is there any mechanism to monitor more closely these arms deliveries?

Mr. MCCOLM. I will begin, and Jerry can follow.

Africa Watch, as well as the World Bank, have reported that particularly military expenditures by the Luanda Government have been "exorbitant" in terms of the World Bank study.

Brazil is one major supplier, and Russia was the other supplier this year. I understand with Russia it had to do with helicopters and some other weaponry. Brazil has to do with armor cars or something like that.

There is a mechanism. The United Nations is only empowered to really say this—in other words, when anything comes to the docks in Luanda or Lobito that they can make note of it, but there are no punitive functions anyone can take.

On the UNITA side, there have been stories about arms purchases in Southern Africa and shipments through Zaire and all. Again, there is very spotty, direct evidence about that. But, again, UNIVEM is only empowered to make reports on this and report to the observing teams.

Mr. BENDER. I will not add much to that other than to say that I agree with Bruce that it is one of the difficulties for outsiders. You can be knowledgeable about planes that are arriving with arms on both sides, you can report it, but you cannot stop it. You are not given that mandate.

The reason why, I think, is that both sides are still distrustful, as everybody has pointed out. And if you are afraid that you might end up going back to war, then you want to be prepared.

So the closer we get to peace, I think it is very important that this point is brought out as often as possible, as you have, so that they will understand at least that they are not doing this in the dark but that they are in an aquarium and that people are watching them.

Mr. MCCOLM. Madam Chairperson, I have heard an explanation that in a certain context makes a lot more sense in some ways than preparation of war. It is that your concessions or your fees on buying and selling arms is quite a lucrative business and that there is a group, let us say, in the Angolan society that tends to make a lot of money on these sales. A number of people think that they have no military significance. In other words, these weapons, even if used, would break down peace, we would lament that but really serve no great offensive capacity.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Dr. Bender, you had stated in your testimony that top officials in Washington and Western Europe consider Angola to be among the most corrupt countries in Africa. Also that, unless there is a

dramatic improvement in the economy, the country will be unable to achieve a meaningful peace.

Yet, in the last statements of your opening statement, you also said that the peace train in Angola will ultimately arrive at the station.

How do you reconcile those two trains of thought?

Mr. BENDER. I think that certainly peace can arrive while corruption remains. Whether it can be a lasting peace and a durable peace is another question.

There has to be a vibrant economy to be able to absorb all of these soldiers and not just the soldiers but all the displaced people and citizens. And that will be more difficult if there is no money. And I think as Angola gains the reputation of being such a corrupt country, the outside world will be less forthcoming with assistance; and it is going to make their job more difficult.

But I am quite confident that we are going to see some moves against it very, very soon.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. McColm, in your testimony, you talked about the many issues that confront UNITA and the Angolan Government. Which ones of those issues do you believe are the most serious ones and which ones are really designed more to stall for time or force negotiations on other issues?

Mr. MCCOLM. Well, Madam Chairperson, I think the most important issue has to do with the practical everyday issue. We have ample reason to believe from—as Congressman Payne pointed out, the examples of Uganda, the examples of Mozambique, that there were programs already on the ground that helped integrate demobilize soldiers into civilian life and gave them some compensation, whether it was land or something.

Those programs have not happened in Angola. And what concerns me is that I think that the life of the everyday soldier that is demobilized I think the peace plan at some point can unravel just simply because of some very basic things that need to be done.

The second thing, clearly a law legalizing UNITA as a political party; a broad amnesty law to be declared by the government are just crucial for there to be momentum to allow for the integration into the military.

I think there are practical reasons—logistical, too—about the slowness of the garrisoning of UNITA troops. I think you should not give them any excuse. In other words, make sure it is a nice facility, a facility that has vocational training so that it is a political problem for UNITA, rather than a physical problem of trying to persuade somebody to come.

I also believe that maybe we as outsiders should step away from insisting on the nature of this vice presidency. I think the private discussions going on between Dr. Savimbi and President dos Santos, on a range of issues, they are very Angolan issues, I think are positive; they go way outside the Lusaka Protocol and probably will mean more to peace than anything. I think we should not insist that somebody take that vice presidency to declare this a success.

And then I think the last element to firm up the garrisoning of the soldiers is really pressure on the government to withdraw from

their forward positions. That has at least given the sense to UNITA of insecurity. They are within range of some of these troop positions. They fear a return to 1992, some of them do, the younger people do. That is their memory of this war. So if there could be confidence-building measures on that score, I think that would be useful.

And then the last would be all assistance goes to local level, local government, local NGO's, rather than through the national government.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Just one more question before I ask Congressman Payne for his question about the U.N. camps. From your long experience, both of you, in Angola, how do the U.N. camps compare with the UNITA facilities from which these troops are moving?

Mr. MCCOLM. Well, I saw the first generation of camps, so I want to be clear about that. I have had reports that they are making some modifications, positively, on the issue of food and on health care for the second generation of camps, the present garrisoning things.

In comparison to where UNITA exists and lives, let us say the menu is less varied. It is very—melee meal with anchovies was what I saw.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What was that?

Mr. MCCOLM. Melee meal is sort of a porridge with anchovies. Outside the camp, a mile away, you had pineapples, peppers, everything, several meats. They think of it as a step down. It is not like if we are in the Sudan or somewhere where you are actually at least being provided consistent food. No, they think it is a step down.

Second, they had a major problem with—about a quarter of these troops are unarmed. They are basically camp followers; they perform kitchen functions; they are members of extended families. And I thought it was a tremendous political mistake by the United Nations to exclude these people when they were being garrisoned, because the commanders thought there was an agreement to garrison as a whole unit, which they counted these people who are unarmed.

I have heard that there have been provisions to take care of these people. But in the camps that I was in in Villa Nova and Londimbale, it was sort of a bitter experience. We came over 300 kilometers to be garrisoned in the open sun—these are all in open areas—with these tents, which are all rotted out—they really are incredibly hot—with no vocational training, no future, we are not told how long we would be there; and the conditions from which we come are actually better. When we were in the bush, it was a better deal than here.

And the problem is—I picked this up also from the people outside the camps. In other words, the population knows that the situation inside the camps is not as good as outside. That goes out through the countryside: why are you going to surrender at the camp when you can stay home and farm; hide your gun; and let us get on with life.

And that has been a major discipline problem, I have to say, and a concern from UNITA people.

At the same time, what I would argue, if that is not totally sufficient for the reasons in delay—which I am sure that is true, it is not totally sufficient—those basic conditions should be taken care of and logistics be supplied to UNITA for rapid delivery of these soldiers who are coming from vast miles around.

They have at least been able—and I think plausibly—to use that as one of the excuses for the delay in garrisoning troops. And, of course, the other which was the forward basing of the government.

But those basic things, Madam Chairperson, I think could be taken care of.

I have to say it was not the worst camps I have seen around the world. But in the Angola context, I did not think they were anything to write home about. And also for the prolonged stay that you would be there, I think there would be serious problems. And Congressman Payne is right, we already know what to do in Central America, Uganda, Mozambique with de-mobilized troops.

Mr. BENDER. I agree with Bruce that the camps should be made as good as possible so that there is no political excuse for not going into them. But, I mean, we have to put it all in perspective.

I have visited refugee camps throughout Angola. And I think these are probably better than the places that most of the regular refugees are forced to live in. And the pictures I saw of starving UNITA troops a year ago, certainly do not correspond to the rosy picture that Bruce just painted of pineapples and food and everything all around.

I mean, I think if we put it in its proper context, maybe the best way is to measure with life around the areas of the camps. There was a period when UNITA was very concerned—as they should be—that people were dying of malaria in the camps. And that is a serious concern. But there are people—you know, the civilian population around them was also dying of malaria. Malaria is a serious problem there. And I do not think we should blame the United Nations or anybody else for them dying of malaria.

I think to put it in a realistic context, they are not that bad. This is about the fourth or fifth time that the issue of these Pakistani tents has come up. I mean, let us put it again in perspective. If UNITA would have entered the camps last November when they originally said they would when the tents arrived and not 6 months later when the tents sat outside in the rain, they would not have been so moldy.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. MCCOLM. But let me clarify. In the camps that I was in, I did compare it to the surrounding area. And let me say it was a stark difference. I think in any of these de-mobilizations, you make the effort because the soldiers are supposedly to be reintegrated into your national army. Unfortunately you have to value those soldiers higher sometimes than refugees, which is too bad; but politically, to make this process work, that is what you have to do.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Congressman Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Just a quick question. It has been indicated that Mr. Savimbi—Dr. Savimbi—whichever one it is. They are still researching it. I do not want to get into that debate. He was Dr. in New York, Mr. in Europe.

It is indicated that he does not want to be a vice president of the country.

What impact do you think his non-participation in a formalized government will have on the UNITA movement or political movement or soldiers?

Mr. BENDER. Well, I agree with Bruce's earlier point that if I were Dr. Savimbi, I would not accept the vice presidency unless I knew what the content of it was, unless I knew that it had something meaningful for me to do than go around cutting ribbons, dedicating the opening of new bridges or whatever it is that they have in mind. And I certainly made that point many times to members of the Angolan Government.

I mean, no self-respecting politician would accept an empty job. Mr. PAYNE. Could I tell Mr. Gore that?

Mr. BENDER. I will resist all the jokes I was about to say.

But, having said that, I am concerned that the government has not presented Savimbi with a meaningful job description, because if he does not feel that it is a good enough job for him and it goes to somebody else in UNITA, there still remains the so-called Savimbi problem: what are we going to do with him? That is going to remain.

And as he himself has stated in recent speeches, if he remains in Balundu, he basically takes himself out of the action. All the political action is in Luanda. And in Balundu he becomes isolated. And once his members of UNITA take up their positions in the new army and the ministers and deputy ministers in the government, then the playing field almost become exclusively in Luanda. Who is going to travel down to Balundu to see a non-actor?

So then I would say in some ways the so-called Savimbi problem, what are we going to do with him, gets even bigger if they cannot present an acceptable job offer to him or if he refuses to accept a good job offer.

So I do think it is a serious problem. But I put the blame really on both sides.

Mr. MCCOLM. Well, Congressman, in conversations I have had with Dr. Savimbi recently, I did not get a burning desire on his part to be vice president or not to be vice president. I think that is important.

What he said to me was in his private discussions with President dos Santos when it was offered, he asked about what the content of this was. And, in fact, the President was very frank: they had not thought it out. And yet since there have been several discussions thinking it out.

So if there is an assumption, which I think some of the UNITA people, including President Savimbi thinks that, internationally, there is an assumption that we are going after sort of the South African model, that is that you would have Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and DeKlerk as two vice presidents with portfolios.

If we are moving into that, apparently that proposal is now on the table being discussed. And my understanding was, at least between the two major actors here, is there is no disagreement of trying to find a solution to this.

Savimbi himself had told me personally he had a candidate of his own, highly respected in the party, for the vice presidency and that

he really felt that the country needed a few years of peace to stabilize, including his movement, and he would be happy to be president of UNITA during this period.

I got a genuine sense for really the first time in 20 years of talking to him that he was looking forward to the future and that the only thing that really concerned him was development. I mean, if they got portfolio in agriculture and a few other things, he would be interested.

Mr. BENDER. I would like to just bring another dimension to this of interest because, fortuitously, I was in Luanda about a week after the Angolan Government offered Savimbi this post.

And many top people in the government criticized President dos Santos for doing this: he did this without our authorization. He did not have to offer him something so important. He could have offered him minister without portfolio. Why did he do that?

And so when I went to see President dos Santos later in the week, my first question was: Why did you offer Savimbi the vice presidency? And he looked at me and he said: Well, you know him as well as I do. You know his ego. You know his aspirations. I could not have offered him anything less than that that would have satisfied him. You have to offer a man like that, you know, something that high.

And he said: I know my colleagues are upset with me, but that is what I thought was necessary to bring him into the peace process.

Therefore, I left that meeting absolutely convinced that the sincerity was there. Spelling out the job description has been more difficult.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on that question about resources, the demilitarization and disarmament in Uganda is moving along at a fairly good rate. One thing that is happening in Uganda is that the economy is gradually improving. I mean, there is expansion there for—you know, there is a little opening for people to move into new positions.

And also Mozambique, which I guess is as close to Angola as you can get, the disarmament or encampment happened before the election. This is a very key difference with. You know, you have the election and you await the outcome. You know, when I first ran for Congress, if it was that way, I would have, you know, because I did not win that election.

So you know it was somewhat of a mistake it seems; although Angola is a very difficult situation and it is just full of mistakes. But the Mozambique situation with Ranomon and so forth, it seemed to work out better because of that reason.

And the other comparison I guess is in Eritrea where the same thing, the military—as a matter of fact, you know what happened in Eritrea, the troops had a little coup d'état. You know, they went out into the yard and they were getting ready to demonstrate; and they were demonstrating because they wanted out, you know, they wanted to get out and start going back to the countryside.

So there is a desire on their part. It is just enabling with resources to move people out. And so it seems that if these other evils, as you were mentioning, are creeping in increase, I cannot

believe that you can say that corruption is getting as bad as Nigeria or Zaire now. Come on.

But it is sad to hear that corruption is increasing because that makes it difficult for the economics to grow. And that makes it difficult for transformation to move forward.

So how do you see the question being resolved? Of course one answer is certainly more external aid, which could assist in capital or cash or something to help. But you know we have not seen much additional foreign aid.

How do you see the resolution of this problem?

Mr. BENDER. It was good that you pointed out the context prior to the election and how they made some mistakes.

But two of the mistakes that were made, at least where lessons have been learned, is, one, do not set some unrealistically short timetable. Eighteen months became magical. Everything had to be done in eighteen months. That is why I think it salubrious that both sides are saying: Let us not rush into it.

And the other one was sort of the efficacy of elections. If you hold an election, everything is just going to be great. And that was not just a mistake made by the United Nations, but the United States. I mean, all of those running the Africa Bureau really were just pushing that election, pushing election, without worrying about disarmament, forming a new army, et cetera.

So I think now you have both a new reality and understanding in the international community, as well as among Angolans themselves, that you have got to take certain fundamental steps one by one to get to a peaceful solution.

And they are doing that, and it is taking a long time. But it is moving in the right direction. So I think that is the difference, and that is why I am more optimistic.

Mr. MCCOLM. Your question is a good one because in the camps that I was in, if you look at the educational basis, it was fourth grade to high school, which is pretty decent. Technical skills were high. After all, this was a military. It was actually beyond a guerrilla movement. So you had a number of mechanics, a number of construction workers, all the skills you need to reconstruct. And Angola needs a lot of reconstruction.

If there are ways to encourage forming cooperatives, forming programs by which one includes de-mobilizing soldiers of both sides, because that army needs to be downsized, you are really unleashing into that society those very skills that you need to build at the local level.

And the amounts of money we are talking about are minuscule. There is a mechanism that is not being used yet, which is the World Bank Social Action Fund. It was created in Latin America to avoid central bureaucracies that are corrupt. There is one now created, modest amount, couple of million in it, for Angola, which they are looking for local partners to do direct small grants to people in the countryside. That is a mechanism that could be very useful to prime the pump for this type of program.

And then we can—you know, whatever the corruption level is, fine; but this would be—it is independently managed, and it should be very useful.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, that is great. Well, I really appreciate it.

Also I have left out Ethiopia where there was a tremendous reduction in the armed forces, you know, Eritrea, Ethiopia, where they had long years of civil strife, and they, too, are starting to see a little bit improvement in the economics of the country; and that helps.

Just a point about rushing elections—you know my colleagues from the IRI criticized elections in Haiti so tremendously; but when President Aristide went back in October, elections were scheduled for June. And you had to do registration. You had to do the whole thing. You had elections.

When I went down to observe, and you know I thought I knew my stuff pretty good, but some polling places you were voting for councilmen and mayor and the Senate and the House, but some places, not the House but the Senate; some places you had overlapping.

It was the most complicated election that I ever saw in June. And to say, first of all, it was done too quickly because his term ran out, because he was out of the country two-thirds of the term; but they said it has got to be done in June.

And so it is almost a self-fulfilling prophecy that you are going to have election fraud and irregularity. And there was election fraud and irregularity. But overall, in taking the situation and evaluating it—if you evaluate it honestly, I think it was almost a miracle that they were able to pull off these elections with illiterate people having to use symbols and colors and four or five different offices all at one time.

So I could not agree more. When we impose timetables that are unrealistic, then we simply are part of the problem rather than the real solution.

Madam Chairperson, thank you very much for your allowing me to take this additional time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Just one more question. Dr. Bender, you had talked about all the rumors that are going on in Angola about the effects of a second Clinton administration or a Dole administration on the peace process, the armings, et cetera.

In the Protocol, as we know, it called for the establishment of a U.N. radio station. This is one of the ways that you could give credible information to the people and put to rest some of these rumors.

What has happened since the station is still not up and running?

Mr. BENDER. I do not know all the details as to why it is not running. The Voice of America is now in the process of establishing a radio station that is being played locally.

And the United Nations certainly did have a TV program—I guess it still does—that has been going on now for almost—let me see—since last August. It is a TV program that airs once a week.

Although the experience there was not always felicitous. And the U.N. Special Representative removed the first director of that when both UNITA and the Angolan Government found that the programs and the director were offending everybody.

I do not know all the details of the radio station, but I understand they are getting close to putting that into operation.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Bruce.

Mr. MCCOLM. My understanding, for the last few months at least is that there is certain time given to the United Nations on government radio.

But let me stress that we found in Cambodia that a separate U.N. station was incredibly useful, particularly in civic education and to dispel all these—you know, we are pushed out by all these urgent rumors that sort of overcome the important events in the country. And it would be awfully useful. And the faster that can get on line, I think, the more progress you will have in terms of building confidence. At the local level there is going to be peace. A great deal of skepticism by the average person. Can these two forces, which have tremendous egos at the top, make peace?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen.

And I thank the audience for being with us.

The subcommittee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon at 4:25 p.m, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement by

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chair, Subcommittee on Africa

for

Hearing on

"A Current Assessment of the Peace Process in Angola"

held by

Subcommittee on Africa

Committee on International Relations

U.S. House of Representatives

Wednesday, May 1, 1996

2:00 p.m., 2200 Rayburn

Almost a year ago to the day, this Subcommittee met to discuss the progress made in the peace process in Angola and on the prospects for a successful conclusion to that process, as well as a transition to a stable representative government.

We discussed the background to the conflict and the economic, social, and political damage caused by the twenty years of civil war. We were filled with the hope that there may finally be an opportunity for a genuine, lasting peace in Angola and for true reconciliation between the two sides in the struggle.

However, as I emphasized then and feel must be stressed now, we have been filled with hope for peace in Angola many times before only to be disappointed by the sluggish pace toward true progress.

A year ago, we looked to the announcement made in May 1995 about UNITA leader, Dr. Savimbi, becoming Vice President of Angola, as a concrete indicator that progress was being made toward the establishment of a government of national unity -- that reconciliation was an attainable goal for Angola.

In the current scenario, questions are still being raised about the nature of the Vice Presidency and other key positions, given the fact that there has been no formal discussion of command structure, description of duties, or issue jurisdiction.

A year ago, military issues were first on the agenda, and today many still remain unresolved, with the success of the peace process hinging on the resolution of these volatile issues and the implementation of these key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

Of course, it would be unfair to say that none of the objectives have been achieved. However, one would expect some minimal progress to be made over the course of an entire year, given that \$350 million are being spent annually on the U.N. peacekeeping operation.

We must face reality.

Much remains to be done and time is running short. Further delays and procrastination could still jeopardize the peace process. It is time for both parties to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process by fulfilling their promises and by accelerating the pace of implementation.

Without the basic elements in place, without a skeletal government infrastructure, without a schematic of priorities for reconstruction, Angola cannot proceed to the next step along its path toward a future of economic and political growth. The peace process is merely the first in the evolution toward a stable society and effective government.

However, I must reiterate that none of this will be possible without the commitment of the two parties involved. The U.S. can't do it. The U.N. and the international community can't do it. The Government of Angola (the MPLA) and UNITA must be determined to set aside personal interests and past animosity, and "jump start" the process by focusing more on the future of their country and the wellbeing of the people of Angola.

One can only hope.

And now, I would like to introduce our first panel headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell. Ms. Bushnell joined the Foreign Service in October 1991 where her first overseas assignment took her to Dakar, Senegal. She later served for two years in the U.S. Consulate General in Bombay, India before returning to Washington, D.C. to head the Executive Development Division of the Foreign Service Institute. In 1989, Ms. Bushnell began a second tour of duty in Dakar as Deputy Chief of Mission. Three years later, she joined the 35th class of the Senior Seminar until being named to her current post. Ms. Bushnell has received numerous accolades for her outstanding service and is now awaiting confirmation for her nomination as Ambassador to Kenya. We wish her the best and Godspeed.

Ms. Bushnell is accompanied by Ambassador Paul Hare who is our Special Envoy to Angola. Ambassador Hare has just recently returned from Angola.

We welcome them both and thank them for being here today.

PANEL II-

Our second panel is composed of two very knowledgeable witnesses who have dedicated many years to issues pertaining to Angola and the peace process. Both have also made recent trips to Angola, having spoken with many of the principles.

First to speak will be Mr. Bruce McCole who is currently the President of the Institute for Democratic Strategies (or IDS). He has held numerous posts in his distinguished career including serving as President of the International Republican Institute; as Director of the Committee for New Investment in South Africa; and as Executive Director and Deputy Director of Freedom House where, among other responsibilities, he coordinated the Freedom House Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties from 1989-1993. Mr. McCole has monitored over three dozen elections in transition societies and, through the Institute for Democratic Strategies, is currently involved in Kenya, South Africa, Angola, and soon in Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique. He has written extensively on subjects ranging from human rights to trends in global democratization.

Mr. McCole will be followed by Dr. Gerald Bender, who is a Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California at Los Angeles. Professor Bender was the Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California from 1986 to 1991. Previously, he taught African politics in the departments of Political Science at UCLA and the University of California, San Diego. He has served on the Board of Directors of the African Studies Association and as the Association's President from 1985-1986. He has received fellowships from various foundations to conduct research on Africa and has been published in numerous academic journals.

We welcome our witnesses for the second panel and thank them in advance for their testimony.

TESTIMONY BY ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
PRUDENCE BUSHNELL
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
MAY 1, 1996

ANGOLA: THE ROAD TO PEACE

Good Afternoon. Madam Chair, members of the Subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to testify on our ongoing efforts to consolidate peace and democracy in Angola. I believe that the strong cooperation between the Administration and Congress has contributed greatly to our success in bringing these goals closer to realization.

Almost three years ago, as the Administration prepared to launch a diplomatic initiative to restart peace negotiations, the Angolan civil war had left almost one third of Angola's population dependent on emergency relief; one thousand Angolans a day were dying of war-related hunger, disease, and injuries; and Angola was experiencing war at an unprecedented level of intensity. Many observers predicted that negotiations would fail, and even after the Lusaka Protocol was signed, warned that the process could not succeed. Today Angola, the site of the UN's largest peacekeeping operation, is on the verge of what few observers thought possible: a genuine, lasting peace.

PARTNERS FOR PEACE

A great many factors have contributed towards Angola's progress towards peace, most importantly the strong will of the Angolan people to end the civil war. Another important factor has been the sustained engagement of U.S. diplomacy, and the close collaboration we have enjoyed with the United Nations, our Troika partners, Angola's concerned neighbors, and the Angolan parties themselves. Our diplomatic team played a key role in the negotiations that produced the Lusaka Protocol, and since then we have used our leverage to pressure the parties to honor their commitments. We have also worked closely and productively with the UN to ensure that the UNAVEM III peacekeeping operation fulfills its important responsibilities to provide a secure framework for the peace process. While active diplomacy addressed the root causes of the conflict, massive humanitarian assistance from the United States and other members of the international community saved the lives of millions of Angolans.

WHERE THE PEACE PROCESS STANDS

The Lusaka Protocol has brought seventeen months of peace, the longest period of peace in Angola in over 30 years. The cease-fire remains firm. Progress in quartering and disarming

troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has moved the process forward significantly. As of April 28, the UN reports that about 24,000 UNITA personnel, representing about one-third of UNITA's claimed military forces, have been disarmed and registered in nine UN-run quartering areas. A further six quartering areas are in varying stages of preparation. Progress in quartering also reflects the steps taken by the Angolan government to honor its obligations under the Protocol. These steps include the release of prisoners; the pullback of its forces from the vicinity of the quartering areas; the termination of its contract with the mercenary firm Executive Outcomes; and the barracking of the anti-riot police.

After their fourth meeting, in Libreville, Gabon on March 1, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Dr. Jonas Savimbi announced their intention to accelerate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. They agreed to quarter all UNITA troops, form a joint senior military command, and integrate UNITA forces into the national armed forces by the end of June. They also agreed to form a Government of National Reconciliation by the end of July. This means that the full UNITA delegation will take its place in the National Assembly, and that UNITA members will assume allotted positions in the Cabinet, provincial, and local administrations, as stipulated in the Lusaka Protocol. President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi agreed to extend indefinitely the mandate for the current legislative and executive term to allow the Government of National Reconciliation and the National Assembly to play a constructive role in Angola's recovery and rehabilitation until elections can be held. President dos Santos also offered officially one of two Vice Presidencies to UNITA, an offer to which Dr. Savimbi promised to respond.

Since Libreville, the Angolan government and UNITA have continued direct talks on issues and meet almost daily in the Joint Commission (including the UN and the Troika), where they adopted a Calendar of Actions for April. Our concerns over the slow pace of the quartering process in late March and early April have been eased somewhat by UNITA's commitment to Ambassadors Hare and Steinberg on April 25 to have a total of 30,000 troops disarmed and assembled by May 8. This commitment to restart the quartering process reflects UNITA's confidence that its concerns about security and supply problems in the quartering areas are being taken seriously and addressed constructively by the UN, which bears primary responsibility for overseeing the quartering process, and by the donors. Close monitoring of the quartering areas will be essential to ensure that problems are promptly identified and addressed. (Ambassador Hare, who has just returned from Angola, can describe the conditions he observed in a quartering area).

Nonetheless, we are deeply concerned by the overall slow pace of the peace process, and have used every opportunity to impress on the parties the need to accelerate the process. The

closely with representatives of the Angolan government and UNITA and with the UN to ensure that this important event takes place. In FY 95, the United States government provided more than \$8 million to non-governmental organizations carrying out demining and mine awareness training in Angola, including \$5 million in DoD funds. We regret that our intention to commit a similar amount in DoD FY96 funds has been held up by new congressional restrictions limiting funding to operations with direct U.S. military participation and limiting the granting of these funds to non-governmental organizations. We hope these restrictions can be overcome.

Ultimately, Angola's recovery from decades of war and the realization of its tremendous economic potential depends not on foreign assistance but on the involvement of the private sector. The Angolan economy is in desperate straits, with a devastated infrastructure, 4,000 percent inflation, and a breakdown in basic services. Angola must urgently undertake the reforms necessary to stimulate its own private sector and attract foreign trade and investment.

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ANGOLA RELATIONSHIP

The central focus of our policy in Angola remains the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the realization of a peaceful, democratic, and united Angola. President dos Santos' first official visit to the United States in December, 1995 allowed President Clinton to emphasize our desire for closer relations, as well as our conviction that the relationship can broaden and deepen only in the context of Angola's continued commitment to the peace process. We have also made clear to UNITA the critical importance of its full compliance with the Lusaka Protocol. The consolidation of peace will also require of all Angolans a deepening commitment to human rights and the strengthening of the institutions essential to safeguarding those rights.

We also believe that, through developing a military to military relationship the United States can help Angola as it faces the formidable task of integrating former combatants and preparing the integrated armed forces to meet its new peacetime responsibilities. Our modest expanded IMET program will help Angola face these challenges.

I would also like to take this opportunity to commend the essential role played by Ambassador Steinberg and the staff of Embassy Luanda. Despite difficult, even dangerous conditions, long hours and heavy responsibilities, they carry out their duties with enthusiasm and dedication. U.S. Special Envoy Ambassador Paul Hare and the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye continue to lend their wisdom and energy to peace in Angola.

Our investment in the Angolan peace process is modest when we consider what is at stake: ending a vast humanitarian crisis, revitalizing the economy of our third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, and creating new opportunities for American business. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Angolan peace process, and Ambassador Hare and I will be happy to answer your questions.

STATEMENT OF R. BRUCE MCCOLM
 PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES
 FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
 THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA.
 REGARDING THE ANGOLA PEACE PROCESS.

Submitted for inclusion in the record
 of the hearing held on May 1, 1996

Thank you, Madame Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on the state of the Angolan Peace process.

I began my involvement in Angola twenty years ago this year when I walked through the southern part of the country with UNITA guerrillas after the Cubans had taken the cities. At that time I wrote about the civil war for the *Washington Post*, *Newsweek* and the *Christian Science Monitor*. Since then, I have returned to Angola on the average of every four years. During my tenure as the executive director of Freedom House I monitored the human rights situation within the country and as the President of the International Republican Institute sent staff to conduct several assessment missions there to evaluate the feasibility of strengthening democratic institutions in that country. Most recently, after I created the Institute for Democratic Strategies, I visited central Angola to assess the progress of the peace process and to establish the possibility of NGO development and conflict resolution training at the municipal and provincial levels. I last visited Angola from February 18 to February 26 just prior to the Libreville summit between President dos Santos and Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

As a personal note, over the last twenty years, several Angolans, who were personal friends of mine, were either killed in battle or assassinated. The most notable of them was a dear friend of mine for over fifteen years, Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's Vice-President, who was slain by government troops in 1992. I had not returned to Angola since then so I had no expectations concerning the current peace process and the present state of the UNITA movement and its views of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. For the first time, I met the children of some of my friends, who now serve in UNITA and have spent their entire lives at war.

In recent weeks there have been press reports voicing concern over Dr. Jonas Savimbi's statements at UNITA's 30th anniversary celebrations and most recently announcements by the Luanda government it was withdrawing from the peace process. Sometimes, Madame Chairman, the urgent drives out the important. It seems there are those in the international community, who seem bent on declaring this process dead on arrival rather than understand that there will inevitably be delays in implementation, charges and counter-charges and the constant need for vigorous and even-handed diplomacy on the part of the United States. A whole generation of Angolans have grown

up in war and experienced the longest civil war in African history. The task of constructing peace and democracy in Angola is daunting enough without us constantly finding another reason to declare the current process in jeopardy or fatally flawed.

Let me describe my visit to the national headquarters of UNITA at Bailundo in the Central Highlands. I travelled there immediately following the UNITA party congress and the previous visits to Angola by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and Brian Atwood, the Director of USAID. During the week I spent there, the MPLA and UNITA concluded their preparatory meetings for the Gabon summit between President dos Santos and Dr. Jonas Savimbi and began their work on a follow-up meeting between the leaders. In other words, both parties felt sufficiently encouraged about their progress at that time that they were already planning the agenda for the next summit.

I met with local NGOs, UNITA's High Command, traditional leaders, UNITA party leadership, members of the UNITA Foreign Ministry and negotiating teams as well as travelled unimpeded around the garrison sites at Vila Nova and Londuimbale. I also took the time to visit the markets throughout the region and talk with the average Angolan.

On the last day of my visit, I held a private three and a half hour meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi covering a range of topics that included both the issues outstanding between UNITA and the Angolan Government, his assessment of the international and regional situation and the new political role he envisioned UNITA assuming in the national life over the new few years. Over the last twenty years, I have held lengthy private discussions with Dr. Savimbi on at least a dozen occasions. Never during all that time have I felt he had assimilated the idea of peace as he has now and was confident in developing UNITA solely as a political organization. Despite expressions of strong skepticism about the government and the United Nations' intentions by other UNITA officials, I found Dr. Savimbi very positive about proceeding down the remaining steps of the peace process.

Recent news reports of Dr. Savimbi's address to his party faithful on the occasion of UNITA's 30th Anniversary apparently concerned some people in Washington but didn't seem to generate any comment from the Luanda government and was deemed of no concern by United Nations officials. In this speech, Dr. Savimbi raised a number of issues which Angolans will have to address in the near-term if democracy and national reconciliation are going to find root in that society. He talked about including other Angolan political parties in the national government, raised the issue of holding a dialogue between the government and the people of Cabinda and discounted the need for him to become the Vice President. In the same address, he also stressed his relationship with President dos Santos and UNITA's commitment to the process. As outside observers, we should understand that both President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi are holding a wide-range of discussions on national issues that are off the agenda of the Lusaka Protocol but are crucial for political developments in the country. The nature of these discussions have not been made public for a variety of reasons.

One of these issues that people have expressed the most concern over is the vice-presidency. During the Libreville summit, it was agreed that one of the vice-presidencies would be given to UNITA for it to choose its candidate, not necessarily Dr. Savimbi. Savimbi told me he did not want simply a ceremonial post but something with responsibility over portfolios such as agriculture. He and President dos Santos agreed on this. Since that summit, the Luanda government recently has instituted decrees making the post more influential. For its part, UNITA has countered with a proposal to eliminate the premiership and to create two executive vice-presidents operating under the direction of the president. Both sides apparently feel there has been progress on this issue. But, I would stress that we should not judge the success or failure of the process on whether Savimbi ultimately accepts the post. Since the real point is to integrate UNITA into the government as a sign of national unity.

Many of the additional issues raised by Savimbi in his discussions with President dos Santos and in his anniversary speech are topics the two have been privately talking about since the Lusaka talks. The incorporation of other political parties into a government of true national unity and the ultimate fate of the Cabinda enclave, however nettlesome for the international community, will have to be addressed at some time. I noticed that after Savimbi's speech that the Luanda government reached a ceasefire with FLEC, the guerrilla movement in Cabinda. Clearly, there appears to be some movement on this other issues, which may be symbolic but just as important to the Angolan reality.

It was clear from hours of meeting with the UNITA political and military leadership that there is a broad consensus that the peace process, however imperfect and unbalanced, is the only possible mechanism for ending the civil war and bringing about an era of national reconciliation. As Savimbi told me, "The withdrawal of the United Nations from Angola would not only be a disaster for UNITA. It would be a national catastrophe."

The visits to Angola by Ambassador Albright and USAID Director Brian Atwood earlier this year helped to solidify the support of UNITA's military leadership for the quartering of their troops despite their very real concerns about the welfare and security of their men. Following my visit, the constant consultation of United States officials with both the Luanda government and UNITA has been extremely helpful in keeping the process on line as much as possible. More importantly, there does still exist on both sides a distrust of the process that can only be overcome by American leadership.

During and after my visit to Angola, Dr. Savimbi expressed and continues to express his satisfaction with both his personal relationship with President dos Santos and the progress of their personal talks. Where I did find concern was over military and security issues. This was particularly true in the UNITA High Command, which believed that the quartered UNITA troops were especially vulnerable to government attack because the FAA maintained forward positions in violation of the peace agreements. This is a very sensitive issue in light of the 1995 attacks on Soyo and the recapture by the government of

the city of Huambo. I know these concerns were shared by Brian Attwood with President dos Santos, who subsequently promised action on this score. My understanding is that the government has taken action in Uige and Bie to rectify the situation but in other areas has not been in compliance. Consequently, UNITA has agreed to garrison a total of 30,000 troops by May 8 and then will freeze the process until government troops pull back to their barracks as called for by the Lusaka Protocol.

At the time of my visit, there had not been any announcements concerning the integration of UNITA's High Command into the national army. This has taken place and now both sides are discussing alterations in the 1994 amnesty law to ensure the security of these UNITA commanders once there assume their new positions. A broad amnesty law is needed so that there is no fear of retribution by either side. Passage of such a law will also be helpful in speeding up the process of incorporating UNITA troops into the national army.

Both the UNITA political and military leadership expressed deep concerns about the welfare of their garrisoned troops. Since my trip, there have been modest improvements in the food situation, some tentative steps to rectify the dreadful health care situation but nothing done about the inadequate shelter. I inspected the camps in Villa Nova and Londuimbale, where roughly 9,500 men are quartered. The situation under which these UNITA troops are housed is neither the worst nor the best I have observed. But there have been more successful examples of this type of operation in Central America and in Uganda, which should be emulated.

While these encampments are never comfortable surroundings for refugees or demobilized soldiers, it would really contribute to the peace process if these basic conditions were improved. News about the camp conditions not only pass between garrisons but also circulates among the UNITA troops who have not begun the process. There has been increased desertions from these camps and quite frankly the situation might lead to a breakdown in discipline. UNITA has faced a major problem in trying to persuade soldiers not to simply disband and go home to farm but to stay in the camps. There has been no efforts at taking an inventory of the skills of those who have been demobilized. There has been no movement in ascertaining who will join the new national army. And, despite promises by the European Community and the Portuguese government, there have been no efforts to introduce vocational training for the demobilized soldiers. Until camp conditions improve and a serious program adopted for reintegrating these men and women into society, the garrisoning process will be delayed and made extremely difficult.

United States policy should encourage establishing both peace and democracy in Angola. While the Lusaka Protocol discusses the integration of UNITA into national government structures, we should be aware that peace and national reconciliation is going to occur at the local and provincial level where both parties will genuinely be sharing power and responsibility. I received frequent complaints from UNITA that the donor community favors the capital city of Luanda and that in UNITA-controlled areas there

does not appear to be a "payback" to the movement for surrendering the political capital it built up with its army. Whether this perception is real or not, there seems to be real reasons to put more carrots on the table for both sides as they meet the basic conditions of the peace process.

For there to be a lasting conclusion to the Angolan civil war, peace must be made operational. This means encouraging a dialogue now about reconstructing those provinces in Angola most ravaged by war and creating new structures of local and provincial government. For this reason, I believe electoral politics should be re-introduced in Angola at this level so as to minimize national conflict and to encourage the electorate to believe it has equity in the new system. Such elections would perhaps serve as the best method of conflict resolution by providing both major political forces strong bases on which to build for future national elections. Local elections also would assist in the delivery of social services and provide a legitimacy to local authorities which they currently lack. Holding a second round of the 1992 presidential elections is an invitation to another national disaster.

Madame Chairman, there are a number of steps that the United States and the international community can take to hasten compliance with the Angolan peace process so we do not lose whatever momentum we have gained since the beginning of the year.

1.) The United States must exert pressure on both the Angolan government and UNITA in an even-handed manner so as not to encourage any reckless military actions that have disrupted the peace process in the past. The extension of the United Nations' mandate in three-month intervals is particularly useful in focusing the competing parties' attention on the larger implications of any further breakdown in the process. However, we must recognize that any withdrawal of the UNAVEM III from Angola in the near future would almost guarantee widespread warfare and doom Angola's chances for peace and stability for the foreseeable future. While there may be factions within the government that believe they could take advantage of such a breakdown for political gain, the prospects of them succeeding are remote.

2.) The successful March 1 summit meeting between President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi in Gabon only reinforces the view that the international community should encourage more frequent meetings during this delicate period in the peace process. It might be useful for the next meeting to take place in Angola, particularly in a province where both the government and UNITA enjoy popular support as Kwanza Sul. At their next meeting, both leaders should be urged to create mechanisms to ensure a permanent dialogue to resolve present and future political problems. Such a mechanism could begin by discussing the issues of decentralization of government and certain symbolic issues such as changing the national flag and the national anthem to be more in tune with the new Angola.

3.) The process of political integration should be more closely linked to that of demobilization and disarmament so as to build more confidence in the peace process.

The United States and the United Nations should encourage the incorporation of UNITA into the provincial governments of Uige and Huambo once the quartering process is completed. This would demonstrate to an anxious population that there is a new era of national reconciliation. This step would also require legalizing UNITA as a political party.

4.) The everyday experience of the garrisoned soldier will have a direct and immediate impact on the success of the peace process. The United Nations and the donor community must expedite the delivery of adequate clothing, food and medical supplies to the recently garrisoned soldiers or face the possibility that the process will further slow down because of the unwillingness of troops to submit themselves to such conditions. In light of other successful programs of demobilization in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Uganda and Mozambique, I would also encourage immediate resources be made available for the compensation of the demobilized forces of both sides, occupational training and resettlement of those soldiers who will not be integrated into the national army.

5.) The United States must use its influence on the Luanda government to prompt the immediate withdrawal of the FAA from its present forward positions so as to create greater security for the garrisoned troops of UNITA and a climate of greater trust among the population.

6.) The United States must urge the Luanda government to stockpile the recent delivery of Russian arms to Angola and suspend any other arms transfers. Likewise, the United States must encourage UNITA to surrender its heavy arms on a timetable.

7.) Where the presence of land mines remains a serious obstacle to reopening the transportation infrastructure of the country, both FAA and UNITA troops should form integrated teams in de-mining efforts. Such de-mining teams should also operate in areas administered by UNITA.

8.) The disarming of the civilian population and the various paramilitary groups, will be one of the most difficult and sensitive aspects of the peace process. Civilian guards, for example, are recruited by regional and local authorities and armed by the local police. Estimates of the number of these guards run from 500 to 2,000 in Huambo alone. Efforts should be made immediately to embark on an aggressive civic education program throughout the nation to encourage disarmament and to pay for the surrender of firearms. Local authorities should be publically urged to disband the civilian guards and other paramilitary groups because these groups are used for intelligence-gathering and are destabilizing the peace process.

9.) The process of revising the constitution should have a very specific time limit. If the National Assembly is to play an independent and active role on issues such as the constitution and decentralization, then it should receive international support for its administration and the training of all its members in these vital issues.

10.) The Luanda government and UNITA both will have to accomodate the needs of international NGOs if foreign assistance is to be effective. Today, NGOs must register with the government and the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Customs. This process, which under the best of circumstances takes at least six months, must be streamlined. All NGOs still have to pay prohibitive port clearance fees for their equipment. Until NGOs receive their registration and country agreement, they cannot have a bank account. These regulations should be reexamined by the government and made more liberal during this critical period.

11.) The USAID country strategy paper, as I read it, rightfully concentrates American assistance on those regions most affected by the civil war. Successful USAID programs in rejuvenating the local economies of Angola and in strengthening new local and provincial governments will make peace and national reconciliation a tangible reality. USAID should be encouraged to develop innovative programs to reach areas where NGOs are not sufficiently developed and where government administrative structures are not yet in place. Likewise, the international community should support the World Bank's program to strengthen a social action fund in Angola that would finance community development. Angolans of both parties have expressed concerns that foreign assistance to the central government bureaucracy will either be misappropriated or rendered totally ineffective.

Madame Chairman, let me conclude by saying that I still believe peace and national reconciliation are real possibilities for Angola. While the major participants have ample reasons for not trusting one another and are realistically wary of each other's intentions, I am confident that if there is persistent attention paid to the peace process by both the Administration and Congress that the process--for the first time in Angolan history--would become irreversible.

That concludes my statement. I'd be pleased to answer any questions you and your colleagues might have.

Professor Gerald J. Bender
School of International Relations
University of Southern California

*"A Current Assessment of
the Peace Process in Angola"*

House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on Africa

1 May 1996

Introduction

I began my testimony last July, when this Committee held its previous Hearing on Angola, with the assertion that "the Angolan predicament is soluble," especially in comparison with a number of other conflicts in the world. In fact, during the ensuing months, the situation in many of the cited conflicts (e.g. Liberia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Rwanda) deteriorated while the situation in Angola improved. Yet, Angola is still a long way from building the requisite foundation for a lasting peace.

The missing ingredient in Angola continues to be a fundamental lack of trust. Not only a lack of trust on the part of the leaders of the Angolan Government and UNITA towards each other but, perhaps more importantly, insufficient trust on the part of the Angolan people -- as well as the international community -- with respect to the actions and intentions of the top officials in both UNITA and the MPLA.

Having said this, however, I want to clarify that I, personally, believe that the peace train in Angola is moving squarely along the tracks and will ultimately arrive at the station. Moreover, the further it advances the more difficult it is for either side to turn that train around. Extremists both within and outside Angola, however, could still derail the train.

There is little that we, as Americans, can do about any potential extremists in Angola but we certainly can, and should, do everything possible to make sure that nobody in the Congress, U.S. Government, or public at large take any actions that could derail Angola's peace process in Angola. It has become almost a national pastime over the past quarter century in the United States for Americans to divide

along partisan lines and point fingers of accusation at one side or another in Angola. I hope that this obsession with finger-pointing has come to end and, instead, we can seek to find ways to help Angolans bridge their mutual suspicions and differences.

There is sufficient finger-pointing in Angola to suffice for the entire world. Angolans appear to have raised the practice of accusation to a new art form. Almost daily one side accuses the other of bad faith or of taking actions that are detrimental to the peace process. It is to be expected at this stage of the process — after decades of war, when mutual suspicions remain high, and when both sides engage in considerable posturing and half-measures — that Angolan political discourse would be consumed with continued accusations and finger pointing. What I am suggesting is that here in the United States we try to avoid exacerbating these understandable suspicions and attempt to assist the Angolan leaders and people to find new areas of trust and cooperation.

The Congress

Today's Hearing is one way by which members of Congress can become further engaged in helping Angola towards peace. Yet, it should be noted that there is a noticeable lack of interest and activity by the House Committee on International Relations compared with the past. I made the same observation in March when I testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. I think the point is worth repeating here.

During the decades of civil war in Angola, Members of the House and Senate — and particularly their staffs — made frequent trips each year to that war-torn country. When the burning issues in Washington involved partisan support for

one side or the other in a military conflict, one could count on numerous Congressional visits to Angola. It has been more than a year, however, since any member of Congress, or *their staff*, has visited Angola. While I realize that forging a peace process is not as "sexy" as fueling a war, I trust that in the coming months this trend will change.

Ironically, in the past it was always difficult to encourage members of the Administration (Republican or Democratic) to visit Angola. Yet, over the last year key members of the Clinton Administration, including National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, have visited Angola. In 1996 alone, Madeline Albright, Ambassador to the UN, Brian Atwood, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and General James Jamerson, the number two ranking General in the U.S. European Command have all made significant trips to Angola. Just last week, Ambassador Paul Hare, the U.S. Special Representative to the Angolan Peace Process had a productive meeting in Andulo, Angola with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Add to this the fact that President Clinton hosted President José Eduardo dos Santos in the White House last December and we can see that this Administration is deeply engaged in the peace process in Angola.

I trust that this Hearing today will encourage members of Congress to become further engaged so that they can work more in concert with the Administration in assisting Angola and Angolans to put a permanent end to the war and to enjoy a meaningful peace. Only one out of every six Angolans alive today has experienced an absence of war. Today, Angola is on the precipice of peace and the Congress has an important role in assisting this process.

Next Steps in Angola

There are some immediate steps that both the Angolan Government and UNITA need to take to move the process to the next plateau. UNITA must increase the speed of quartering its troops and significantly improve on the quality of the soldiers and weapons that are showing up at the camps. One must applaud the commitment that Jonas Savimbi gave last week to the U.S. Ambassador to Angola Donald Steinberg and Ambassador Hare to improve in all these areas -- especially his pledge to include artillery and tanks among the weapons and to achieve up to 35-40, 000 troops by May 8th. We now await delivery on his promise. UNITA's record of unfulfilled promises to deliver its troops and weapons under UNAVEM II and III has given new meaning to the phrase "seeing is believing."

The Government, for its part, must actually carry out its declarations on the removal of all mercenaries on its side and quartering of the special rapid intervention force. The latter are still quartered in only 8 of the 10 sites in the country. Furthermore, Government troops must withdraw to barracks sufficiently distant from the UNITA camps -- this is an area where there has been some slippage as of late. It is also imperative that President dos Santos declare a general amnesty so that UNITA officers who left the FAA in October 1992 can be assured that they will not be arrested as deserters when they are reincorporated into the FAA over the next few months.

The Government should also begin to take immediate steps in the economic arena that, while not directly related to the peace process, would contribute significantly to restoring economic and social stability in the country, which is necessary for peace to obtain in Angola. The problem in Angola used to be that many people

had money but there was a scarcity of products to buy. Today, the situation is just the opposite — one can find most products available in Luanda but few people have the money to buy them.

Runaway inflation has literally wiped out the middle class and moved Angola closer to a two-class society of the very rich and the very poor. Printing larger denominations of bills certainly helps avoid the necessity of carrying a briefcase full of money to buy a meal but it does not address the rising problem of inflation. It is not surprising that the IMF has adopted the posture of all but ignoring Angola until the leadership produces coherent and meaningful economic plans.

Corruption in the Government appears to rising almost as fast as inflation. Top officials in Washington and Western Europe now consider Angola to be among the most corrupt countries in Africa — on a par with Nigeria and Zaire (although it is not clear that Zaire belongs on such a list today since there is little left to steal). One can expect to see an increase in the strikes that have recently plagued the country. It is not realistic for the Angolan Government to exhort professionals, such as doctors and teachers — who recently went on strike, to make greater sacrifices when they earn the equivalent of \$1 a month and see the pool of funds that could increase their salaries diverted to foreign bank accounts of many of those who are demanding their sacrifice.

Unless there is a dramatic improvement in the economy the country will be unable to achieve meaningful peace. Margaret Anstee, the U.N. Special Representative in Angola from 1991 to 1993, stated the dilemma eloquently in a recent letter to the editor of the *Financial Times* (11 April 1996):

"Angola finds itself in a cleft stick. Without economic revival and genuine prospects of a decent livelihood for the thousands of soldiers who have to be absorbed into civilian life, the peace agreement signed in Lusaka in November 1994 will remain fragile. And without some acceleration of the painfully slow progress in implementing that agreement, public confidence that the war is really over will remain low, and the climate unfavorable to reconstruction, investment, and development."

Conspiratorial Theories

There is a widespread belief (on both sides in Angola) that the question of war and peace will hinge on the outcome of the U.S. elections in November. In essence the assumptions are that if Bob Dole were elected, the U.S. Government would provide UNITA with sufficient military equipment to return to war and, perhaps, defeat the Angolan Government; and if Bill Clinton were re elected, the U.S. Government would eschew all war options and remain committed to supporting the peace process. I find myself continually responding to these alleged scenarios, including recent interviews with two different Angolan radio stations as well as the BBC. Not long ago U.S. Ambassador Steinberg appeared on Angolan TV to deny that these assumptions have any basis in reality.

What is so seductive about these assumptions — as with any good conspiratorial theory — is that they can explain almost everything. "Why is Savimbi moving so slowly on the quartering of his troops?" Obviously, according to the theory, because he is waiting for a Dole victory next fall that will enable him to obtain the means to lead his troops back to war. "Why, on the other hand, is the Government continuing to obtain new armaments illicitly (e.g., from Brazil)?" Because, again according to the theory, they will be needed if Dole is victorious in the November elections.

My response to all this has been to deny the assumptions strongly on the grounds that U.S. policy toward Angola has become genuinely bipartisan, and I hear no rumblings from the Dole camp favoring a return to war in Angola. I see little or no

support for the U.S. to serve as the major patron of any group fighting to overthrow a new government of national reconciliation.

It would be helpful if you and your colleagues could clarify, once and for all, the spurious nature of this conspiratorial theory. There would be no better way to do this than to demonstrate bipartisan cooperation in support of the peace process in Angola. During the recent Senate Hearing on Angola, it would not have been possible for any outsider to identify the party affiliation of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on their questions or comments. There was not the slightest hint of favoring a return to war or even of providing UNITA with lethal aid again. I trust that the same message will emerge, unambiguously, from this Committee and from others in the House.

One area in which this Committee might begin to demonstrate its bipartisan commitment would be to correct a serious flaw in the otherwise commendable law covering U.S. Government support for de mining. Department of Defense funds in FY96 can only be used where there is direct U.S. military participation. What this means for Angola is that roughly half the funds the U.S. has been spending on various dimensions of de-mining in Angola (e.g., \$8.5 million last year) would be eliminated in the future.

The Peace Dividend for the U.S. and Angola

One reason why it is easy to forge a bipartisan American policy in support of peace in Angola is that it is not only good for Angola but it is good for American business. Peace is already generating prosperity for the U.S. Take, for example, the area of Soyo in northern Angola. Two years ago UNITA overran the town and destroyed tens of millions of dollars of equipment and infrastructure, thus halting the Texaco operations in Soyo. Government attacks in this area last December threatened to seriously

undermine President dos Santos' visit to the White House. Now that peace has returned to Soyo, Texaco and its partners will soon be pumping 35-40,000 barrels of oil/day. This production, combined with Chevron's added production in Cabinda, will result in *an increase of revenues for American corporations of \$300-400 million a year.*

Furthermore, the Angolan Council of Ministers recently approved concessionary rights for two new American oil companies to enter into Angolan oil exploration. Amoco and Mobile will be operators of two new blocks this year. Citibank is in the process of opening an office in Angola, and Coca-Cola is about to set up a plant. California-based Mampeza is in the process of modernizing and expanding its tuna, mackerel, and sardine processing facilities in Benguela, Angola. Mampeza, which has been operating at minimal capacity over the past two decades, attributes its exciting prospects to peace and vital assistance from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.

Peace also means greater security for the more than \$3 billion already invested by American companies and helps assure opportunities for many others that are waiting in the wings to invest more money in the future.

Madam Chair and Members of the Committee, peace in Angola is not only possible but probable. Yet it needs all the help that can be mobilized in Angola, the United States, and the rest of the world. I trust that all of you will commit yourselves to this noble effort.



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